

There can, in our view, be no doubt that racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their national political aspirations and fear for their economic future, was the fundamental cause of the outbreak of August last. [...]

A National Home for the Jews, in the sense in which it was widely understood, was inconsistent with the demands of Arab Nationalists while the claims of Arab Nationalism, if admitted, would have rendered impossible the fulfillment of the pledge to the Jews. [...]

To the Arabs it must appear improbable that such competitors will, in years to come, be content to share the country with them. These fears have been intensified by the more extreme statements of Zionist policy and the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrant not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future. [...]

Their position is now acute. There is no alternative land to which persons evicted can move. In consequence a landless and discontented class is being created. [...]

We consider that the political and economic grievances of the Arabs, as explained to us in evidence, must be regarded as having been immediate causes of the disturbances of August last.

But even if this were not our view [they added] we should have been bound to examine those grievances in the light of the second part of our task, since it is clear that recommendations, even when most carefully considered and most thoroughly applied, could not, unless they went to the root of the matter, succeed in avoiding a recurrence of the recent unfortunate disturbances. [...]

[Arab opposition to Jewish immigration was] well-founded in that it has its origin in the known results of excessive immigration in the past and that, given other and more immediate causes for disturbance, that feeling undoubtedly would be a factor which would contribute to an outbreak. [...]

We are only concerned with the land-problem in so far as an examination of it was necessary to enable us to estimate the extent to which the difficulties involved in it were either a contributory cause to the recent disturbances or are likely to be a cause of disturbance in the future. But for this purpose such an examination was clearly essential. We think that a continuation, or still more an acceleration, of a process which results in the creation of a large discontented and landless class is fraught with serious danger to the country. If it be accepted that the conversion of large sections of those who are now cultivators of the soil into a landless class be, as we think, not only undesirable in itself, but also a potential source of disturbance, it is clear that further protection of the present cultivators' position and some restriction on the alienation of land are inevitable. The "Protection of Cultivators" Ordinance of 1929 does nothing to check the tendency to which we have referred. The mere provision of compensation in money may even encourage it. [...]

The Arabs argue that if these proclamations and appeals did not constitute a pledge, they were a deception practiced in the moment of her need by a great nation upon the credulity of a trusting and confiding people. They aver that if they had suspected that the policy of Great Britain was, or would be, to create a National Home for those whom they regard as an alien race in the country in which they have lived for 1,300 years, they would not have taken the action they did or have incurred the risks inseparable from it. [...]

As late as June 1918 active recruiting was carried out in Palestine for the Shereefian army, our allies, the recruits being given to understand that they were fighting in a national cause and to liberate their country from the Turks. These men, it is believed, actually took part in the offensive against the Turks. The tendency of the evidence is to show that in spite of the fact that nothing had been said about Palestine being included in the Hedjaz Empire and the fact that the Balfour Declaration had

been published in 1917, the real impression left upon the Arabs generally was that the British were going to set up an independent Arab State which would include Palestine. [...]

It has been argued before us that the Arab *fellaḥ* takes no personal interest in politics and that the present state of popular feeling, which in every village and in most country districts finds its expression in such cries as "Down with the Balfour declaration" and in demands for a national government, is the result of propaganda promoted artificially and for personal ends by men who wish to exploit what may be, as far as they are concerned, quite genuine grievances.

The contention that the *fellaḥ* takes no personal interest in politics is not supported by our experience in Palestine. No one who has been about the country as we have been and has listened to the applause which greeted many passages in the addresses read to us by village heads and *sheikhs* could doubt that villagers and peasants alike are taking a very real and personal interest both in the effect of the policy of establishing a National Home and in the question of the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine. No less than 14 Arabic newspapers are published in Palestine, and in almost every village there is someone who reads from the papers to gatherings of those villagers who are illiterate. During the long season of the year when the soil cannot be tilled the villagers, having no alternative occupation, discuss politics, and it is not unusual for part of the address in the mosques on Friday to be devoted to political affairs. The Arab *fellaheen* and villagers are therefore probably more politically minded than many of the people of Europe.

We are not prepared to say that there is no truth in the argument that the increased interest which the *fellaheen* of today are unquestionably taking in political and constitutional issues is the result of propaganda. Opposition to the present policy is the very foundation of the political creed of the Palestine Arab Executive; the members of that body have made no secret of their beliefs and it would not be unnatural were they to seek to convince fellow-countrymen of their own race that the present policy is inimical to Arab interests. We have no reason to doubt that in the prosecution of their demand for self-government the Arab leaders, as a whole, have been inspired by a genuine feeling of patriotism; some few may desire a return to the days of a corrupt regime, but of that there is no evidence. We are therefore unable to accept the contention that propaganda on the constitutional issue has been fostered by the leading Arab politicians with the motive of gratifying personal ambitions or of attaining personal ends.

The position today is that the Arab people of Palestine in their demand for representative government. This unity of purpose may weaken but it is liable to be revived in full force by any large issues which involve racial interests. It is our belief that a feeling of resentment among the Arab people of Palestine consequent upon their disappointment at the continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government ... was a contributory cause to the recent outbreak and is a factor which cannot be ignored in the consideration of the steps to be taken to avoid such outbreaks in the future. [...]

It is not possibly by summary or by quotation to indicate either the purport of the statement or the extent to which Mr. Churchill denied the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. We therefore reproduce his statement in Appendix V to this Report.

Within its limits the statement is clear and explicit but, as we read it, it was designed as a corrective to the aspirations entertained among certain sections of Jewry rather than as a definition of the rights of the non-Jewish sections of the community in Palestine.

In our view it would be of great advantage if His Majesty's Government were to issue some more positive declaration of the meaning which they attach to the second part of the Balfour Declaration, and to those provisions in the Mandate which, being based upon that part of the Declaration, provide for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

We should further urge that in the interests alike of all sections of the people of Palestine and of the local Administration, His Majesty's Government should define with unequivocal clearness the meaning which they attach to the Balfour Declaration as a whole, and should state with equal clarity the course of policy which they intend to be pursued in that country in the future. [...]

*Recommendations*

- (a) The issue of a clear statement of the policy which His Majesty's Government intend to be pursued in Palestine...with the least possible delay," including a definition of the meaning of the passages in the Mandate which purported to safeguard the interests of the "non-Jewish communities.
- (b) A revision of the methods of regulating immigration to prevent a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926 and to provide for consultation with non-Jewish representatives with regard to it.
- (c) The initiation of a scientific expert inquiry into the prospects of introducing improved methods of cultivation in Palestine and the regulation of land policy in accordance with the results.
- (d) A re-affirmation of the statement made in 1922 that the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization by the Mandate does not entitle it to share, in any degree, in the government of Palestine. [...]