

These projects would, of course, do much more than aid in the resettlement of refugees. They would enable the people throughout the area to enjoy a better life. Furthermore, a solution to the refugee problem would help in eliminating the problem of recurring incidents which have plagued and embittered the settlements on both sides of the borders.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

The second problem which I mentioned is that of fear. The nature of this fear is such that it is hardly within the capacity of the countries of the area, acting alone, to replace the fear with a sense of security. There, as in many other areas, security can be assured only by collective measures which commit decisive power to the deterring of aggression.

President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that, given a solution to the other related problems, he would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent war or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries will be willing to join in such a security guaranty, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations.

By such collective security measures the area could be relieved of the acute fears which both sides now profess. The families located near the boundaries could relax from the strain of feeling that violent death may suddenly strike them; the peoples of the area whose standards of living are already too low would no longer have to carry the burden of what threatens to become an armaments race if indeed it does not become a war; the political leadership of the area could devote itself to constructive tasks.

PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES

If there is to be a guaranty of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel and the Arab States were fixed by the armistice agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part, at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.

The task of drawing permanent boundaries is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. Surely the over-all advantages of the measures here outlined would outweigh vastly any net disadvantages of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety. In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments, I believe it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties. The United States would be willing to help the search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should desire.

If agreement can be reached on these basic problems of refugees, fear, and boundaries, it should prove possible to find solutions for other questions, largely economic, which presently fan the flames of hostility and resentment.

It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United Nations review of the problem.

I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would be desirable to have a settlement; nor have I tried to outline in detail the form which a settlement of any of the elements might take. I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an immeasurable improvement and that the possibilities do not require any nation taking action which would be against its interests, whether those interests be measured in terms of material strength or in terms of national prestige and honor. I have also, I trust, made clear that the Government of the United States is disposed to enlarge those possibilities by contributions of its own, if this be desired by those concerned.

Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich contributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of this century.

At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin*, no. 33, 5 Sept. 1955, 378-80; reproduced in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, II: 395-8.

Document 7: Sir Ivoone Kirkpatrick Minute: *The Middle East*, 30 October 1955

EGYPT

Egypt constitutes the most difficult problem. We should not write her off or drive her irrevocably into Russia's arms. On the other hand it would be a mistake to give the impression that blackmail pays.

An attempt should be made to detach Egypt from Russia. But it would be a mistake to make representations to Nasser at this stage. If he were to reject them, relations with Egypt would be exacerbated. If he complied, we should not be ready with measures to reward him and relations would once more deteriorate.

Moreover reports from Cairo describe Nasser as being intoxicated with the popularity which defiance of the West has brought him. The moment does not seem propitious.

Finally, an approach to Nasser now would be regarded in Turkey, Iraq and elsewhere as appeasement. It would be better to fortify the Northern Tier before undertaking any move in Cairo.

Nevertheless the United Kingdom and United States Governments should begin now to concert a package deal which should be put to Nasser at the first favourable opportunity after the necessary preparatory work has been done. The following would be the elements of the package deal.

- A. Nasser would undertake:-
- (a) To turn away from Russia on completion of the present arms deal, which would be a once and for all commercial transaction.
 - (b) To limit his arms purchases thereafter to an expenditure which the Egyptian economy can bear, having regard to the régime's commitments in social welfare.
 - (c) To agree to open negotiations with Israel for a settlement on Alpha lines.
- B. The Western powers would undertake:-
- (a) To license the sale of weapons to Egypt within the limits defined in A (b).
 - (b) To bring concerted and strong pressure on Israel to agree to a just settlement.
 - (c) To finance the immense cost of the High Dam.
 - (d) To use such influence as they have in Iraq and the Sudan to put Egyptian relations with these countries on a sound footing.

These terms would be negotiable, but if Nasser rejects collaboration with the West on these lines we should:-

- (a) Refuse all economic aid to Egypt.
- (b) Cut off all further arms deliveries.
- (c) Endeavour to isolate Egypt.
- (d) Consider ways and means of bringing down the Regime, and make it plain to Nasser that we have vital interests in the area and will shrink from nothing to protect them from Soviet encroachments.

Source: PRO FO371/115469 V1023/19G.

*Document 8: Anthony Eden's Guildhall (Mansion House) Speech,
9 November 1955*

... Between Israel and Egypt lies an area of dangerous tension. During the past seven years we have been trying to bring about some kind of settlement – successive governments in this country and our allies in that part of the world – and to prevent competition in armaments there. We have not been entirely unsuccessful. Despite frontier incidents from time to time – some more serious than others – there has been no war since 1948. The level of arms has been kept comparatively low, and this applies especially to more modern weapons. There's been some kind of a balance, though naturally each side cries loudly that it is less favoured than the other.

... I had hopes, real hopes, that many peoples in these lands were beginning to see that a way to peace must somehow be found in all their interests. We have been working for a long time past without publicity to promote such a result. In this connection the reception given to Mr Dulles' proposals last August was by no means discouraging. It should be followed up, but now – now into this delicate situation the Soviet Government have decided to inject a new element of danger and to deliver weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines, to one side only. It is fantastic to pretend that this deliberate act of policy was an innocent commercial transaction. Of course, ... it is no such thing. It is a move to gain popularity at the expense of the restraint shown by the West, and by this means it is intended to make it easier for Communism to penetrate the Arab world. Its consequences should be clear for all to see. Many proud states, some of which have not long enjoyed independence and national identity, will be threatened with submergence in the Communist Empire if they fall victims to these tactics. For our part, we find it impossible to reconcile this Soviet action with protestations that they wish to end the cold war in the new spirit of Geneva. The authors of these actions must have known well enough in advance what the effect of the sudden arrival of these large quantities of arms must be. It has brought a sharp increase of tension with very dangerous possibilities, particularly between Egypt and Israel. And yet, when nations face each other in hostility, it's not much use just blaming them for getting arms wherever they can. It is not with the recipients but with the suppliers that the main responsibility must lie.

BRITISH AIMS

Now, ... what is our immediate task? It is to prevent the outbreak of war. ... [References to hostilities in the al-Auja DMZ and to efforts of UNTSO under General Burns.]

... I have never known a situation where it was clearer that neither party had anything whatever to hope for in the long term from any military conflict. ... [More references to hostilities in the al-Auja DMZ and to recent talks with General Burns.] It will be a great gain if the risk of frontier incidents can be reduced. It will be a greater gain if the tragic problem of the refugees can be dealt with. I much regret that the hard work which Mr Johnston of the United States has devoted to preparing irrigation schemes has not yet been accepted by those concerned. It should be, for it is in the interests of all, Israeli and Arab

1. Item (d) does not appear in (or was excised, without ellipsis, from) the published version of the telegraphic and abridged text in *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 709 (D384)