

Nevertheless the United Kingdom and United States Governments should begin now to concert a package deal which should be put to Nasser at the first favourable opportunity after the necessary preparatory work has been done. The following would be the elements of the package deal.

- A. Nasser would undertake:-
- (a) To turn away from Russia on completion of the present arms deal, which would be a once and for all commercial transaction.
 - (b) To limit his arms purchases thereafter to an expenditure which the Egyptian economy can bear, having regard to the régime's commitments in social welfare.
 - (c) To agree to open negotiations with Israel for a settlement on Alpha lines.
- B. The Western powers would undertake:-
- (a) To license the sale of weapons to Egypt within the limits defined in A (b).
 - (b) To bring concerted and strong pressure on Israel to agree to a just settlement.
 - (c) To finance the immense cost of the High Dam.
 - (d) To use such influence as they have in Iraq and the Sudan to put Egyptian relations with these countries on a sound footing.

These terms would be negotiable, but if Nasser rejects collaboration with the West on these lines we should:-

- (a) Refuse all economic aid to Egypt.
- (b) Cut off all further arms deliveries.
- (c) Endeavour to isolate Egypt.
- (d) Consider ways and means of bringing down the Regime, and make it plain to Nasser that we have vital interests in the area and will shrink from nothing to protect them from Soviet encroachments.

Source: PRO FO371/115469 V1023/19G.

*Document 8: Anthony Eden's Guildhall (Mansion House) Speech,
9 November 1955*

... Between Israel and Egypt lies an area of dangerous tension. During the past seven years we have been trying to bring about some kind of settlement – successive governments in this country and our allies in that part of the world – and to prevent competition in armaments there. We have not been entirely unsuccessful. Despite frontier incidents from time to time – some more serious than others – there has been no war since 1948. The level of arms has been kept comparatively low, and this applies especially to more modern weapons. There's been some kind of a balance, though naturally each side cries loudly that it is less favoured than the other.

... I had hopes, real hopes, that many peoples in these lands were beginning to see that a way to peace must somehow be found in all their interests. We have been working for a long time past without publicity to promote such a result. In this connection the reception given to Mr Dulles' proposals last August was by no means discouraging. It should be followed up, but now – now into this delicate situation the Soviet Government have decided to inject a new element of danger and to deliver weapons of war, tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines, to one side only. It is fantastic to pretend that this deliberate act of policy was an innocent commercial transaction. Of course, ... it is no such thing. It is a move to gain popularity at the expense of the restraint shown by the West, and by this means it is intended to make it easier for Communism to penetrate the Arab world. Its consequences should be clear for all to see. Many proud states, some of which have not long enjoyed independence and national identity, will be threatened with submergence in the Communist Empire if they fall victims to these tactics. For our part, we find it impossible to reconcile this Soviet action with protestations that they wish to end the cold war in the new spirit of Geneva. The authors of these actions must have known well enough in advance what the effect of the sudden arrival of these large quantities of arms must be. It has brought a sharp increase of tension with very dangerous possibilities, particularly between Egypt and Israel. And yet, when nations face each other in hostility, it's not much use just blaming them for getting arms wherever they can. It is not with the recipients but with the suppliers that the main responsibility must lie.

BRITISH AIMS

Now, ... what is our immediate task? It is to prevent the outbreak of war. ... [References to hostilities in the al-Auja DMZ and to efforts of UNTSO under General Burns.]

... I have never known a situation where it was clearer that neither party had anything whatever to hope for in the long term from any military conflict. ... [More references to hostilities in the al-Auja DMZ and to recent talks with General Burns.] It will be a great gain if the risk of frontier incidents can be reduced. It will be a greater gain if the tragic problem of the refugees can be dealt with. I much regret that the hard work which Mr Johnston of the United States has devoted to preparing irrigation schemes has not yet been accepted by those concerned. It should be, for it is in the interests of all, Israeli and Arab

1. Item (d) does not appear in (or was excised, without ellipsis, from) the published version of the telegraphic and abridged text in *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 709 (D384)

alike; and we are ready to help here also, as we have done with the Arab refugees. But, ... beneath the volcanic crust of these smouldering dangers lies a deeper peril [still]: the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Here time has proven no healer. There is no progress to report to you since the armistice agreement six years ago. If it were not for these harsh and enduring sentiments, the countries of the Middle East could give all their efforts to their economic and social plans. They could concentrate on building up happy and prosperous societies in their lands. As I have said, we have tried for a long time past to find common ground for some kind of settlement. I think that the time has come now when the acute dangers of the situation command us to try again. We must somehow attempt to deal with the root cause of the trouble, and our country has a special responsibility in all this, for we have a long tradition of friendship with the Middle East. I believe that it should be possible to find common ground between the two positions. There is, after all, one interest which both parties ought to share. Neither Israel nor her Arab neighbours can want to see their differences turned to the advantage of anyone else; and there is somebody else quite ready to receive the advantage.

Now Sir, from that starting point, can we not look once again at the proposals which the United States Government and we ourselves have advocated? We have only one desire in this — if our Arab and Israeli friends would only believe us — to help to find a means of living which will enable the peoples concerned to dwell side by side in peace.

FRONTIER PROBLEMS

Let us give one instance. If there could be accepted arrangements between them about their boundaries, we, Her Majesty's Government, and, I believe, the United States Government and perhaps other powers also, would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides; and that might bring real confidence and security at last. Our countries would also offer substantial help, financial and other, over this tragic problem of the refugees.

All this we will do. But can we not now move even a little further than this? And I think the Guildhall is the right place to make this suggestion. The position today is that the Arabs on the one side take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions. That is where they are. They have said that they would be willing to open discussions with Israel from that basis. The Israelis[,] on the other side, found themselves on the later armistice agreement of 1949, and on the present territories which they occupy. Now, ... between those two positions there is, of course, a wide [gap. But is it] so wide that no negotiation is possible to bridge it? It is not right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored, but equally can it be maintained the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation just as they stand? The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace, which is in both their interests and to which we want to help them, they must make some compromise between these two positions.

OFFER OF SERVICES

... I am convinced that it is possible to work this out. And if we could do so it would bring relief and happiness to millions, and the sooner the better. If we

fail to do so, none can tell what the consequences will be. I want to say tonight, ... that Her Majesty's Government, and I personally, are available to render any service in this cause. If there is anything — anything — that we can do to help we would gladly do it for the sake of peace.

Source: BBC Overseas Service transcription reproduced in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, II: 413–15. Prepared text in PRO FO371/115880 VR1076/335G. Ellipses are mainly rhetorical references to 'My Lord Mayor' of London, etc.

Document 9: Draft of Proposed Agreed Position Between US and UK on Middle East Policy, 9 November 1955

'Mr Russell took me in to see Mr Dulles this morning and the latter read through the document. The amendments shown in ink [here in *italics*; paras. 9, 15 and 16] were made at Mr Dulles's suggestion. He said he would want further time to study the paper if it were to become an agreed document and instructed Mr Russell to telegraph it to Washington for comment. [These comments, transmitted on 14 Nov., are given in subsequent footnotes.] I said that on our side too there was no commitment. Mr Russell and I agreed that we would try to reach final agreement on this paper when he visited London next week.¹

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Premises

1. Our policy in the Middle East has been directed towards retaining the area within the free world, developing the oil resources, assisting in the economic and social development of the countries concerned, ensuring an adequate defense arrangement for the area as a whole, keeping a reasonable arms balance between Israel and the Arab states, and working toward a settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute.
2. The Russians have now elected to open a new cold war front in the Middle East. Our recent exchanges show that they are not to be moved from this policy.
3. In consequence we must be prepared to settle down to a long contest. This means that a consistent long term policy must be devised. There is no short cut.
4. This Western policy must be based upon the need to have most of the inhabitants of this large area with the West and upon their willingness to let the West have easy access to their oil fields.
5. The obligations of the Western Powers to Israel under the 1950 Declaration [Document 1, above] must be fulfilled. But Israel must be made to understand that the West cannot afford to estrange the Moslems. Otherwise the Arab states will fall away, come under Russian domination; and it will then be impossible for the West effectively to protect Israel.²

1. Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 10 Nov. 1955, PRO FO371/115469 V1023/23G.

2. State Department suggested adding the words: 'and Arab states'. Hoover to Dulles (Geneva), 14 Nov. 1955, *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 746 (D407).