

alike; and we are ready to help here also, as we have done with the Arab refugees. But, ... beneath the volcanic crust of these smouldering dangers lies a deeper peril [still]: the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Here time has proven no healer. There is no progress to report to you since the armistice agreement six years ago. If it were not for these harsh and enduring sentiments, the countries of the Middle East could give all their efforts to their economic and social plans. They could concentrate on building up happy and prosperous societies in their lands. As I have said, we have tried for a long time past to find common ground for some kind of settlement. I think that the time has come now when the acute dangers of the situation command us to try again. We must somehow attempt to deal with the root cause of the trouble, and our country has a special responsibility in all this, for we have a long tradition of friendship with the Middle East. I believe that it should be possible to find common ground between the two positions. There is, after all, one interest which both parties ought to share. Neither Israel nor her Arab neighbours can want to see their differences turned to the advantage of anyone else; and there is somebody else quite ready to receive the advantage.

Now Sir, from that starting point, can we not look once again at the proposals which the United States Government and we ourselves have advocated? We have only one desire in this — if our Arab and Israeli friends would only believe us — to help to find a means of living which will enable the peoples concerned to dwell side by side in peace.

#### FRONTIER PROBLEMS

Let us give one instance. If there could be accepted arrangements between them about their boundaries, we, Her Majesty's Government, and, I believe, the United States Government and perhaps other powers also, would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides; and that might bring real confidence and security at last. Our countries would also offer substantial help, financial and other, over this tragic problem of the refugees.

All this we will do. But can we not now move even a little further than this? And I think the Guildhall is the right place to make this suggestion. The position today is that the Arabs on the one side take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions. That is where they are. They have said that they would be willing to open discussions with Israel from that basis. The Israelis[,] on the other side, found themselves on the later armistice agreement of 1949, and on the present territories which they occupy. Now, ... between those two positions there is, of course, a wide [gap. But is it] so wide that no negotiation is possible to bridge it? It is not right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored, but equally can it be maintained the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation just as they stand? The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace, which is in both their interests and to which we want to help them, they must make some compromise between these two positions.

#### OFFER OF SERVICES

... I am convinced that it is possible to work this out. And if we could do so it would bring relief and happiness to millions, and the sooner the better. If we

fail to do so, none can tell what the consequences will be. I want to say tonight, ... that Her Majesty's Government, and I personally, are available to render any service in this cause. If there is anything — anything — that we can do to help we would gladly do it for the sake of peace.

Source: BBC Overseas Service transcription reproduced in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, II: 413–15. Prepared text in PRO FO371/115880 VR1076/335G. Ellipses are mainly rhetorical references to 'My Lord Mayor' of London, etc.

#### Document 9: Draft of Proposed Agreed Position Between US and UK on Middle East Policy, 9 November 1955

'Mr Russell took me in to see Mr Dulles this morning and the latter read through the document. The amendments shown in ink [here in *italics*; paras. 9, 15 and 16] were made at Mr Dulles's suggestion. He said he would want further time to study the paper if it were to become an agreed document and instructed Mr Russell to telegraph it to Washington for comment. [These comments, transmitted on 14 Nov., are given in subsequent footnotes.] I said that on our side too there was no commitment. Mr Russell and I agreed that we would try to reach final agreement on this paper when he visited London next week.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE MIDDLE EAST

##### The Premises

1. Our policy in the Middle East has been directed towards retaining the area within the free world, developing the oil resources, assisting in the economic and social development of the countries concerned, ensuring an adequate defense arrangement for the area as a whole, keeping a reasonable arms balance between Israel and the Arab states, and working toward a settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute.
2. The Russians have now elected to open a new cold war front in the Middle East. Our recent exchanges show that they are not to be moved from this policy.
3. In consequence we must be prepared to settle down to a long contest. This means that a consistent long term policy must be devised. There is no short cut.
4. This Western policy must be based upon the need to have most of the inhabitants of this large area with the West and upon their willingness to let the West have easy access to their oil fields.
5. The obligations of the Western Powers to Israel under the 1950 Declaration [Document 1, above] must be fulfilled. But Israel must be made to understand that the West cannot afford to estrange the Moslems. Otherwise the Arab states will fall away, come under Russian domination; and it will then be impossible for the West effectively to protect Israel.<sup>2</sup>

1. Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 10 Nov. 1955, PRO FO371/115469 V1023/23G.

2. State Department suggested adding the words: 'and Arab states'. Hoover to Dulles (Geneva), 14 Nov. 1955, *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 746 (D407).

6. In the coming contest with Russia the West enjoys certain solid advantages. There is no reason to be stampeded into panic measures; or to give the Russians and the Arabs the impression that we have lost confidence in our ability to protect our interests.
7. Egypt is the largest of the Arab states and no Western policy in the Middle East which is actively opposed by Egypt will be entirely satisfactory. An effort should be made to prevent Egypt falling completely under Russian domination. Only if this is seen to have failed should we have recourse to a policy of isolating Egypt.
8. Meanwhile the Northern Tier<sup>3</sup> can constitute a focus of Western influence. It must be sustained and strengthened. We must demonstrate that association with the West pays.
9. We must try to influence the smaller Arab states against association with Egypt or Saudi Arabia for purposes hostile to our policies.
10. Finally, we must recognize that it is the Israel-Arab conflict<sup>4</sup> which has weakened Western influence in the Middle East and opened the door to Russia. If we wish to maintain a position of influence with the Arabs we must bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible. This means strong pressure on Israel and also on the Arab states. [*modified from*: 'on those Arab states on which we still have influence'.]

#### Future Policy

11. General. We must continue to make plain to the people of the Middle East our policy of equal friendship and desire to assist in the development of the area. We must avoid being pushed by the Russians into a position of opposition to Arab interests. We must not start a competition with the Soviet Union to arm the countries of the area.
12. The Soviet Union. We should make no further attempt to plead with the Russians to abandon their present offers to the Middle East countries, although we should continue to make it plain to the world that we regard this as incompatible with the Soviet pretense to desire reduction of tension. We should resist any effort by the Soviet Union to claim as of right to participate in decisions regarding Middle East affairs. Means should be found of assuring the Soviets that it is not the purpose of the Baghdad Pact to provide the Western Powers with strategic air bases in countries contiguous to the Soviet Union. This must be considered in the light of the British position in Iraq. Subject to this, we should continue our efforts to build up a defensive system in the area while keeping open the possibility, when our position is stronger, of working out some *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union.
13. Israel. Under present conditions the US and the UK should not grant a special security guarantee to Israel. Such a guarantee will continue to be offered to Israel in the context of a settlement of the Palestine question. This policy might have to be reviewed if it should develop that Egypt was working closely

3. State Department suggested adding the words: 'backed up by other states of [the] N[ear] E[ast]'. *Loc. cit.*

4. State Department comments at this point that 'Western influence has also been weakened by [the] slow pace of economic and political development in the Arab world'. *Loc. cit.*

with the Soviet bloc and there was no chance of bringing about a reversal of this trend. In such an event the US might adhere to the Northern Tier and grant a guarantee to Israel at the same time.

Israel should be urged in her own interests to try to reach a settlement with the Arab states. If she is to survive, she cannot afford to pursue a policy which estranges the Arabs from the West. This will involve a willingness to agree upon some compromise between the United Nations resolutions of 1947 and the present armistice frontiers.<sup>5</sup>

14. Armament supplies. We should try to arrange a coordinated policy of arms supplies to Middle East countries on the part of the Tripartite Powers, Italy, and perhaps other NATO Powers. Machinery to this effect should be worked out in Washington at an ambassadorial level between the three Powers. Consideration should be given to the question of associating Italy in this study.

Our guiding principle is that we should not seem to be moving in to supply Israel with arms on a large scale to offset those supplied by the Iron Curtain [countries]. The Western Powers have in the past supplied arms to both sides under the principles of the 1950 Declaration and this should continue to guide our arms shipments to the area. With respect to Israel,<sup>6</sup> arms shipments by any one of the Western Powers should take into account shipments to Israel either made or contemplated by other Powers, and should reflect the security afforded to Israel under the 1950 Declaration. It should be our purpose not to allow a substantial increase in the striking power of the Israeli armed forces, although some increase in their defensive equipment should be contemplated.

15. Egypt. We should not write off Egypt or drive her into Russia's arms. There are indications that Nasser does not desire to be identified with the Soviet bloc. It is probable that he envisages a neutralist policy in which the Arab world, with Egypt at its head, would be in a strong bargaining position. His present attitude to the West has been affected (a) by the Israel question and (b) by his opposition to the development of the Baghdad Pact. We should not make an immediate approach to Nasser on either of these two issues. He is intoxicated by his present popularity and this is clearly not a propitious moment. *However, we should not of course reject any overture Nasser might make.*<sup>7</sup>

We should hope that the next few months will show whether he is ready to mend his fences with the West and avoid further involvement with the Soviet bloc. We should assist him in this period by refraining from any punitive measures, and keeping contact with him over such matters as the Aswan Dam, the Sudan, and other subjects of common interest. The object would be to reach a point at which Egypt would be willing in effect to turn away from Russia as a source of arms, to limit arms purchases to her economic capacity, to give

5. State Department comments generally on this section regarding the implications of the Tripartite Declaration, the prospect of US adhesion to the Baghdad Pact, and the existence of other 'possibilities for agreement' other than the two mentioned ('unduly restrictive'). *Loc. cit.*

6. Presumably, State Department suggested adding the words: 'and Arab states' at this point. *Loc. cit.*

7. State Department generally endorses idea of letting Egypt take the initiative, especially since Nasir 'continues to appear very interested in economic development [of] his country'. *Loc. cit.*

support to the Jordan Waters Plan, and to agree to open negotiations for a settlement with Israel. In such a case we would offer to supply Egypt with her reasonable arms requirements, assist in the financing of the High Dam, bring influence on Israel to agree to a just settlement, and help Egypt to play a role of leadership in the Arab world. An opportunity might be made at the November 20 meeting at Baghdad to make it plain that behind the defense of the free countries of the area provided by the Baghdad Pact it is our object to foster cooperation among the Arab powers for constructive purposes, and that this need not be confined to members of the Pact. Egyptian leadership in such an effort is not excluded.<sup>8</sup>

If all this fails and Egypt is clearly lost to Western influence, we should have to consider policies which would minimize the harm which she could do to Western interests.

16. Northern Tier. It is the intention of the United States to maintain [*deleted*: 'a high level'] liaison with the Baghdad Pact Council and to give material support to its members. *The scope of the material support which the US will give to the Baghdad Pact members will depend on further studies by the US Government. These will take account of the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to Western military relations with Iran.* Her Majesty's Government as a member of the Pact will seek to establish effective machinery for cooperation among the members in the interest of common security. It is the intention of both the US and the UK to give full public support to the Pact as evidence of Arab cooperation with the free world. Advantage might be taken of the forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce the creation of machinery (with appropriate United States participation) to consider and satisfy the arms requirements of the countries concerned.

Source: PRO FO371/115469 V1023/23G (typed copy with revisions in pen). Cf. text in *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 728-32 (D396), which incorporates these revisions, with slight stylistic alterations.

8. State Department comments: 'We should start devising [a] formula whereby Nasser while remaining outside [the] Baghdad [P]act is able in some way to associate himself with it'. *Loc. cit.*

*Document 10: Aide-Mémoire from the Israeli Embassy, Washington, to the Department of State, 6 December 1955*

The Government of Israel has always upheld the necessity of a settlement with the neighboring Arab States.

2. It notes that the Secretary of State, in his Aide-Mémoire of November 21, advocates an 'approach which involves concessions by Arab states as well as Israel'. While the Israel Government believes that the legitimate interests of Israel and the Arab States are reconcilable as they stand, it holds that if concessions are to be made they must be based on equality and reciprocity. The Aide-Mémoire of November 21, however, discusses a territorial concession by Israel, without indicating the need for any specific territorial concession to be made by any Arab State.

3. If the Arab States prevent violence from their side of the demarcation line, Israel will maintain complete calm on its side. Israel's policy is, also, to avoid reaction to provocation, except when such abstention imperils the security of its population or the integrity of its territory. The assistance of the United States would be welcomed in securing the cessation of 'commando' raids and other violent actions now being carried out against Israel on various fronts, principally on Egypt's responsibility.

4. Israel's only intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba are those of free passage in conformity with its elementary rights under international law. If Egypt does not use force to impede passage in the Gulf, there is no reason to anticipate the use of force by Israel to ensure it. Moreover, if negotiations with Egypt prove feasible, Israel will abstain from any action in the Gulf likely to prejudice them.

5. The Government of Israel was interested to hear the view expressed by the Secretary of State on November 21, that there is now a chance of a settlement. Unfortunately, this impression is not borne out by the current acts and statements of Arab Governments. Encroachments continue into Israel, on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts. There is still no certainty of Arab acceptance of Ambassador Johnston's plan, which may well serve as a test of Arab sincerity. Arms from Soviet sources continue to flow into Egypt. In these circumstances, it is likely that the Egyptian regime is merely attempting to give an illusory impression of peaceful intent, in order to gain time for strengthening its forces in preparation for intimidation or aggression when the time is ripe. At any rate, the Government of Israel is unaware of any concrete evidence which would disprove this analysis of Egyptian intentions.

6. Nevertheless, in order to assist the Secretary in his exploration, the Government of Israel submits its confidential views on the contribution which Israel might make in the context of a peace settlement. The settlement to which Israel aspires is one which would benefit both parties, by inaugurating an era of development and social progress; by enabling a reduction of defence expenditures; and by initiating processes of political, economic and cultural cooperation. Israel does not advance a claim to any of the territory held by Arab States under the General Armistice Agreements. On the other hand, Israel sees no reason for ceding any of its territory to any of the neighboring Arab States, and cannot see its way to discussing a settlement on such a prejudicial basis.