

support to the Jordan Waters Plan, and to agree to open negotiations for a settlement with Israel. In such a case we would offer to supply Egypt with her reasonable arms requirements, assist in the financing of the High Dam, bring influence on Israel to agree to a just settlement, and help Egypt to play a role of leadership in the Arab world. An opportunity might be made at the November 20 meeting at Baghdad to make it plain that behind the defense of the free countries of the area provided by the Baghdad Pact it is our object to foster cooperation among the Arab powers for constructive purposes, and that this need not be confined to members of the Pact. Egyptian leadership in such an effort is not excluded.⁸

If all this fails and Egypt is clearly lost to Western influence, we should have to consider policies which would minimize the harm which she could do to Western interests.

16. Northern Tier. It is the intention of the United States to maintain [*deleted*: 'a high level'] liaison with the Baghdad Pact Council and to give material support to its members. *The scope of the material support which the US will give to the Baghdad Pact members will depend on further studies by the US Government. These will take account of the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to Western military relations with Iran.* Her Majesty's Government as a member of the Pact will seek to establish effective machinery for cooperation among the members in the interest of common security. It is the intention of both the US and the UK to give full public support to the Pact as evidence of Arab cooperation with the free world. Advantage might be taken of the forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce the creation of machinery (with appropriate United States participation) to consider and satisfy the arms requirements of the countries concerned.

Source: PRO FO371/115469 V1023/23G (typed copy with revisions in pen). Cf. text in *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 728-32 (D396), which incorporates these revisions, with slight stylistic alterations.

8. State Department comments: 'We should start devising [a] formula whereby Nasser while remaining outside [the] Baghdad [P]act is able in some way to associate himself with it'. *Loc. cit.*

Document 10: Aide-Mémoire from the Israeli Embassy, Washington, to the Department of State, 6 December 1955

The Government of Israel has always upheld the necessity of a settlement with the neighboring Arab States.

2. It notes that the Secretary of State, in his Aide-Mémoire of November 21, advocates an 'approach which involves concessions by Arab states as well as Israel'. While the Israel Government believes that the legitimate interests of Israel and the Arab States are reconcilable as they stand, it holds that if concessions are to be made they must be based on equality and reciprocity. The Aide-Mémoire of November 21, however, discusses a territorial concession by Israel, without indicating the need for any specific territorial concession to be made by any Arab State.

3. If the Arab States prevent violence from their side of the demarcation line, Israel will maintain complete calm on its side. Israel's policy is, also, to avoid reaction to provocation, except when such abstention imperils the security of its population or the integrity of its territory. The assistance of the United States would be welcomed in securing the cessation of 'commando' raids and other violent actions now being carried out against Israel on various fronts, principally on Egypt's responsibility.

4. Israel's only intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba are those of free passage in conformity with its elementary rights under international law. If Egypt does not use force to impede passage in the Gulf, there is no reason to anticipate the use of force by Israel to ensure it. Moreover, if negotiations with Egypt prove feasible, Israel will abstain from any action in the Gulf likely to prejudice them.

5. The Government of Israel was interested to hear the view expressed by the Secretary of State on November 21, that there is now a chance of a settlement. Unfortunately, this impression is not borne out by the current acts and statements of Arab Governments. Encroachments continue into Israel, on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts. There is still no certainty of Arab acceptance of Ambassador Johnston's plan, which may well serve as a test of Arab sincerity. Arms from Soviet sources continue to flow into Egypt. In these circumstances, it is likely that the Egyptian regime is merely attempting to give an illusory impression of peaceful intent, in order to gain time for strengthening its forces in preparation for intimidation or aggression when the time is ripe. At any rate, the Government of Israel is unaware of any concrete evidence which would disprove this analysis of Egyptian intentions.

6. Nevertheless, in order to assist the Secretary in his exploration, the Government of Israel submits its confidential views on the contribution which Israel might make in the context of a peace settlement. The settlement to which Israel aspires is one which would benefit both parties, by inaugurating an era of development and social progress; by enabling a reduction of defence expenditures; and by initiating processes of political, economic and cultural co-operation. Israel does not advance a claim to any of the territory held by Arab States under the General Armistice Agreements. On the other hand, Israel sees no reason for ceding any of its territory to any of the neighboring Arab States, and cannot see its way to discussing a settlement on such a prejudicial basis.

7. The following is the general outline of a settlement which Israel would envisage:

- (i) The Government of Israel is ready to authorize a meeting at any appropriate level between its representatives and those of the Government of Egypt, to discuss progress towards a settlement, it being clearly understood that the basis for such a meeting would not include the cession of any part of Israel's territory to a neighboring state.
- (ii) Israel is prepared to discuss mutual adjustments of the armistice frontier for the benefit of both parties, on the understanding that the integrity and continuity of Israel's territory is not impaired.
- (iii) Israel would be willing, in the context of a peace settlement, to contribute substantially to the opening of freer communications between all the States of the Near East, so as to enhance the economic strength and commercial enterprise of the region, and promote political and cultural understanding. These measures, which would in each case be effected without change of the existing territorial jurisdiction, might include on Israel's part:
 - (a) Provision for communication by air and railway between Egypt and Lebanon;
 - (b) Port facilities in Haifa for the Kingdom of Jordan, including transit rights by road to and from the Port;
 - (c) A transit arrangement to be agreed to by Israel for communication between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan, it being clearly understood that Israel will not cede territory, whether populated or unpopulated, in the Negev.
 - (iv) The Government of Israel recalls that it had already conveyed its affirmative attitude, subject to certain reservations, to the proposal on refugee compensation contained in Secretary Dulles' speech of August 26, 1955.
 - (v) The United States is also aware of Israel's readiness to cooperate in an agreed plan for the coordinated use of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, as elaborated by Ambassador Johnston. The Government of Israel would welcome information on the attitude of the Arab Governments to this project.

8. The subjects proposed above for discussion and action represent a significant contribution by Israel to the establishment of peace with the Arab States. These States would, of course, have to make a corresponding contribution in order to ensure fair conditions for a peaceful settlement on the basis of mutuality. Thus, freedom of transit for Arab traffic between Egypt and Lebanon would entail corresponding freedom for Israeli traffic northwards over Lebanon and southward over Egypt. Similarly, if the Kingdom of Jordan is to have free access to and from Haifa and port facilities therein, it should agree to restore free access to the Wailing Wall, the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus. Similarly, there should be a broad element of mutuality in any territorial adjustments agreed upon in accordance with Paragraph 2. Egypt should abstain from blockades and practices of maritime interception. Indeed, this duty is incumbent upon her under the Armistice Agreement, whether or not a settlement is achieved. In the context of a settlement such as that discussed

here, all Governments should undertake to abstain from pressure and intimidation against governments or agencies wishing to trade with any state in the Middle East.

9. In discussing the prospect of a peaceful settlement, the Government of Israel cannot ignore the prejudicial effects of the increasing preponderance of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, in armed strength. Unless prompt steps are taken to reduce this perilous disparity, by providing Israel with additional arms for self-defence, such as would be matched in quality and effectiveness to the arms now obtained in Egypt, there will be an inevitable aggravation of Arab intransigence and of Israel's apprehensions. In such circumstances the Israel Government finds it difficult to conceive any hopeful discussion of progress towards peace.

Source: *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 823-5 (D436).

*Document 11: Statement of General Principles which would
Provide a Satisfactory Basis for the Resolution of the Several Points
at Issue between the Arab States and Israel, Authorized by
Gamal Abd al-Nasir, 4 February 1956*

I. TERRITORIAL

- A. The establishment of Arab sovereignty over a satisfactorily substantial territory connecting Egypt and Jordan and forming a part of one or the other of those two states.
- B. The establishment of permanent boundaries by means of alterations of the Armistice Demarcation Lines for such purposes as:
 1. Restoring to Arab border villages adjoining farmlands and groves formerly tilled by the inhabitants of those villages,
 2. Improvement of communications,
 3. Improvement of access to water supplies, and
 4. The general rationalization of boundaries.

II. REFUGEES

- A. Arab refugees from Palestine to be provided a choice between repatriation and compensation for loss of real property.
- B. Phasing of the return to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.
- C. Refugees granted repatriation to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.
- D. Refugees electing resettlement and compensation to be moved from the refugee camps and resettled as rapidly as possible.
- E. Assistance to be provided by the International Community, probably under UN auspices, for the reestablishment of all refugees.

III. JERUSALEM

Formulation of solutions of the problems of territorial division and supervision of the Holy Places which are acceptable to the world community.