

7. The following is the general outline of a settlement which Israel would envisage:

- (i) The Government of Israel is ready to authorize a meeting at any appropriate level between its representatives and those of the Government of Egypt, to discuss progress towards a settlement, it being clearly understood that the basis for such a meeting would not include the cession of any part of Israel's territory to a neighboring state.
- (ii) Israel is prepared to discuss mutual adjustments of the armistice frontier for the benefit of both parties, on the understanding that the integrity and continuity of Israel's territory is not impaired.
- (iii) Israel would be willing, in the context of a peace settlement, to contribute substantially to the opening of freer communications between all the States of the Near East, so as to enhance the economic strength and commercial enterprise of the region, and promote political and cultural understanding. These measures, which would in each case be effected without change of the existing territorial jurisdiction, might include on Israel's part:
 - (a) Provision for communication by air and railway between Egypt and Lebanon;
 - (b) Port facilities in Haifa for the Kingdom of Jordan, including transit rights by road to and from the Port;
 - (c) A transit arrangement to be agreed to by Israel for communication between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan, it being clearly understood that Israel will not cede territory, whether populated or unpopulated, in the Negev.
 - (iv) The Government of Israel recalls that it had already conveyed its affirmative attitude, subject to certain reservations, to the proposal on refugee compensation contained in Secretary Dulles' speech of August 26, 1955.
 - (v) The United States is also aware of Israel's readiness to cooperate in an agreed plan for the coordinated use of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, as elaborated by Ambassador Johnston. The Government of Israel would welcome information on the attitude of the Arab Governments to this project.

8. The subjects proposed above for discussion and action represent a significant contribution by Israel to the establishment of peace with the Arab States. These States would, of course, have to make a corresponding contribution in order to ensure fair conditions for a peaceful settlement on the basis of mutuality. Thus, freedom of transit for Arab traffic between Egypt and Lebanon would entail corresponding freedom for Israeli traffic northwards over Lebanon and southward over Egypt. Similarly, if the Kingdom of Jordan is to have free access to and from Haifa and port facilities therein, it should agree to restore free access to the Wailing Wall, the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus. Similarly, there should be a broad element of mutuality in any territorial adjustments agreed upon in accordance with Paragraph 2. Egypt should abstain from blockades and practices of maritime interception. Indeed, this duty is incumbent upon her under the Armistice Agreement, whether or not a settlement is achieved. In the context of a settlement such as that discussed

here, all Governments should undertake to abstain from pressure and intimidation against governments or agencies wishing to trade with any state in the Middle East.

9. In discussing the prospect of a peaceful settlement, the Government of Israel cannot ignore the prejudicial effects of the increasing preponderance of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, in armed strength. Unless prompt steps are taken to reduce this perilous disparity, by providing Israel with additional arms for self-defence, such as would be matched in quality and effectiveness to the arms now obtained in Egypt, there will be an inevitable aggravation of Arab intransigence and of Israel's apprehensions. In such circumstances the Israel Government finds it difficult to conceive any hopeful discussion of progress towards peace.

Source: *FRUS 1955-1957*, XIV, 823-5 (D436).

*Document 11: Statement of General Principles which would
Provide a Satisfactory Basis for the Resolution of the Several Points
at Issue between the Arab States and Israel, Authorized by
Gamal Abd al-Nasir, 4 February 1956*

I. TERRITORIAL

- A. The establishment of Arab sovereignty over a satisfactorily substantial territory connecting Egypt and Jordan and forming a part of one or the other of those two states.
- B. The establishment of permanent boundaries by means of alterations of the Armistice Demarcation Lines for such purposes as:
 1. Restoring to Arab border villages adjoining farmlands and groves formerly tilled by the inhabitants of those villages,
 2. Improvement of communications,
 3. Improvement of access to water supplies, and
 4. The general rationalization of boundaries.

II. REFUGEES

- A. Arab refugees from Palestine to be provided a choice between repatriation and compensation for loss of real property.
- B. Phasing of the return to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.
- C. Refugees granted repatriation to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.
- D. Refugees electing resettlement and compensation to be moved from the refugee camps and resettled as rapidly as possible.
- E. Assistance to be provided by the International Community, probably under UN auspices, for the reestablishment of all refugees.

III. JERUSALEM

Formulation of solutions of the problems of territorial division and supervision of the Holy Places which are acceptable to the world community.

IV. STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AND ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS DERIVING THEREFROM

A. The parties to recognize formally the termination of the state of belligerency.

B. Following the termination of this state of belligerency:

1. Lifting of the secondary boycott—that is, discontinuance of all measures taken by the Arab states to prevent trade with Israel by non-[Arab countries and non-[Arab firms, and
2. Removal of all restrictions on shipping, other than normal maritime regulations.

V. UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT OF THE JORDAN VALLEY

The states affected to agree to the proposals for the unified development of the Jordan Valley developed in discussions with Ambassador Eric Johnston.¹

Source: Text in 'Message (No. 74, from Cairo) to Robert B. Anderson, at Washington', 4 February 1956, *FRUS 1955-1957*, XV, 139-40 (D75).

1. The unsigned message continues: 'Nasr asked that Mr Anderson be told that he did not regard the question of the development of the Jordan Valley waters as an integral part of a settlement, but that he was willing to reaffirm his approval and support of the Johnston plan.'

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Although many historians designate 14 May 1948 as the start of the first Arab-Israeli war, Itamar Rabinovich argues that this inter-state war was preceded by a *de facto* civil war which had broken out in Mandatory Palestine on the morrow of the 29 November 1947 UN vote which recommended partition. See his 'Seven Wars and One Peace Treaty', in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives*, 2nd ed., ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 34-58.
2. A detailed examination of these five episodes is given in the author's *Futile Diplomacy*, Vol. 3: *The United Nations, the Great Powers, and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), cited hereafter as *FD3*.
3. I am grateful to Professor Shimon Shamir for suggesting this terminology. The concept is also used by Abraham Ben-Zvi in his recent study, *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
4. On the concept of prenegotiation, see, e.g., Janice Gross Stein, ed., *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Negotiation* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Jay Rothman, 'Developing Pre-Negotiation Theory and Practice' (Project on Pre-Negotiation Update), Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Leonard Davis Institute, Policy Studies #29, May 1989, special issue of the *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, XIII:1 (March 1991).
5. Evelyn Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56*, selected for publication by John Charmley (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986).
6. For a discussion of the appropriate and inappropriate applications of the term 'collusion', see Mordechai Bar-On, *The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back, 1955-1957* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 243f.
7. See, e.g., *Diplomacy in the Near & Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*, Vol. 2, ed. J.C. Hurewitz, (Octagon Reprint, 1972), documents 109 and 113; Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 3rd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 301f.; Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 110-14, 122f. The latter work (p.110) makes passing reference to Francis Russell 'collaborating with British officials'.
8. Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1977), 184. Cf. Eban's second autobiography, *Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992), 245f.
9. David Ben-Gurion, 'ha-Mum ha-Sodi Im Nasser' (The Secret Negotiations with Nasser), *Maariv (Weekly Supplement)*, 2, 9, 16 and 23 July 1971; *My Talks with Arab Leaders* (Jerusalem: Keter/New York: Third Press, 1972), Chs 47-53.