



State of Palestine

The National Early
Recovery and
Reconstruction Plan
for **GAZA**

**International
Conference in Support
of the Reconstruction
of Gaza**

Cairo,
Arab Republic of Egypt

October 2014

GAZA





Mulla, Mahmud Ahmad, M'Dayr, Central, Gasa, Ghaf, of, and others. This section contains a list of names and their associated locations or contexts. The names are listed in a specific order, and the locations are indicated by the text following each name. The list includes names like Mahmud Ahmad, M'Dayr, Central, Gasa, Ghaf, and others, with locations such as Rafah, Gaza, and various international locations like London, New York, and Paris.

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ACRONYMS

AHLC	Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
AMA	Access and Movement Agreement
ASP	Agricultural Support Programme
CFW	Cash For Work
CMWU	Coastal Municipalities Water Utility
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Commercial and Services Rehabilitation Programme
CTA	Central Treasury Account
DARP	Development Assistance and Reform Platform
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labor Organization
IRP	Industrial Repair Programme
KV	Kilovolt
LACS	Local Aid Co-ordination Secretariat
MCM	Million Cubic Meters
MIRA	Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment
MOEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MONE	Ministry of National Economy
MOPAD	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development
MSME	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PEGASE	Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-économique
PFI	Palestinian Federation of Industries
PID-MDTF	Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund
PRDP-MDTF	Palestinian Reform and Development Plan Multi-Donor Trust Fund
PSS	Psycho-Social Support
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
STLV	Short Term Low Volume
TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training
UNDP/PAPP	United Nations Development Programme Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USD	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization







State of Palestine

FOREWORD

Gaza is once more in crisis. Seven weeks of bombardment and ground incursions have left thousands dead and injured and half a million people displaced. The physical destruction is vast in scale. Yet it is the human loss that is truly incomprehensible and from which will be the hardest to recover.

Palestinians living in Gaza have suffered too long and too much. They deserve a future that is free from restriction, confinement, and destruction. With their resilience, ingenuity, and determination, our people in Gaza are more than capable of making the coastal region of Palestine flourish and prosper.

Full recovery from years of conflict and devastation can happen only if Gaza is once more connected with the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and all parts of Palestine are once more open to the world. Free movement of people and goods will catalyze Gaza, catapulting it from its current crisis into socio-economic sustainability. Freedom of access must be guaranteed. The borders must be opened. Trade must flow. People must travel.

The past months have been some of the grimmest in Palestinian history. And, yet, it was not a new experience. Since the Nakba in 1948 until now, Palestinians have been forced through too many dark days. Israeli military action is constant, with massive assaults in tragic repetition: in Gaza, six-year old children have already lived through three major assaults that have robbed them of friends, family, and their childhood innocence.

But our Palestinian people will continue to move forward towards their dream of an independent, prosperous, and peaceful state, with East Jerusalem as their capital. When Gaza last faced such destruction in 2009, Palestinian unity was still a distant dream. Now, our people have achieved that unity, brought together by the National Consensus Government, formed just weeks before the assault on Gaza began. Our Government will exert all efforts to recover, repair, and rebuild Gaza as an integral region of Palestine.

We extend our hand to the international community, to our partners in peace and our friends in times of need. We challenge the world to be ambitious and daring in helping us realize our dream of prosperity and justice in an independent state, free of military occupation. An immediate measure is to end the blockade on Gaza and ensure our people never again experience the horrors of this summer.

A brighter future is on the horizon. Give Palestinians in Gaza the tools, the opportunities, and the freedom to secure that future - here and now.

Rami Hamdallah

Prime Minister



State of Palestine

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This document was prepared by the Palestinian Government's Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee for Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction, supported by the Inter-Governmental Technical Committee.

This Plan will be used to consolidate resources and responses to help the Palestinian people in Gaza rebuild their lives and livelihoods. As such, it forms the basis for mobilizing resources and efforts at the international conference in Cairo, Egypt on October 12, 2014 and provides the guiding framework for all relief, early recovery, and reconstruction interventions.

The Government would like to express its appreciation to the institutions that contributed to the development of this plan and the rapid damage and needs assessment that underpins it, including the line ministries, other Government bodies, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the Office of the Quartet Representative, international and national NGOs, and the private sector. Special appreciation goes to Egypt and Norway for organizing the donor conference.

As we work together to provide our people in Gaza with a better future, we acknowledge the damage that can never be undone and the loss that will remain, even when peace and prosperity return. We honor the memory of the thousands who have died, we mourn with those left behind, and stand with those who have suffered the most.

Finally and with the greatest sorrow, we remember the children: those who have died and those who still live, haunted by the horrors of this assault and the other assaults that have overshadowed their childhoods.

Mohammad Mustafa

Deputy Prime Minister

Chairman of Inter-Ministerial Committee



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2014, the Israeli military launched a sustained assault on Gaza. For seven weeks, Gaza was invaded and bombarded from land, sea, and air. The human loss was great: at least 2,145 people were killed, including 581 children. One in four Palestinians in Gaza was forced to flee, and over 60,000 houses were partially or completely destroyed. Public services have been devastated, creating scarcity of water, energy, food, and shelter. Agriculture, industry, and trade are at a standstill, leaving ever more Gaza residents without a livelihood.

This devastating assault follows decades of occupation and border closures that have left our people in Gaza isolated, impoverished, and vulnerable. Gaza was already in the grip of a humanitarian and environmental crisis before the assault began. A seven-year blockade had suffocated the private sector, creating widespread dependency: 80 percent of Gaza residents were already dependent on aid, 47 percent were food insecure, and 40 percent were unemployed.

The National Consensus Government has developed this Palestinian National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan to provide a roadmap through the current humanitarian crisis to long-term development. The Gaza Early Recovery and Reconstruction Rapid Needs Assessment forms the backbone of the plan. Conducted by Palestinian ministries and agencies with the support of local and international partners, it uses the situation prior to the assault as a baseline but contextualizes it within the experience of Israel's long and continuing blockade of Gaza.

This Plan was developed with the intention to transition from relief efforts to longer-term development needs across four sectors – social, infrastructure, economic, and governance. The Government will respond to the urgent and chronic needs of Gaza with relief, recovery, and reconstruction interventions in each of these sectors that will reinforce the foundations for longer term development and growth.

Gaza is an integral part of the Palestinian state and its gate to the Mediterranean. Its development is crucial for the viability of the Palestinian state and for the two-state solution. The Government will no longer accept the isolation and repression of our people in Gaza. Renewed growth and prosperity in Gaza is the Government's moral and national imperative. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the success of the Government in the reconstruction of Gaza is key to ensuring the stability of Gaza, Palestine, and the region.

Through the National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, the Government will take - and lead - a series of measures to uphold its responsibility towards Gaza and its residents and ensure rapid improvements to their lives, by working on multiple paths, in cooperation with partners in civil society, the private sector, and donors, while maintaining national ownership. Response is already ongoing, under the leadership of the Government through its Bridging to Recovery Initiative that guides the transition from emergency to early recovery.

Initial rapid assessments have provided early evidence on the scale of the damage caused by the 51-day assault and form the basis for the Government's response plan. Nearly half a million people were displaced at the height of the conflict and more than 11,200 injured, resulting in an increase in the number of poor, unsheltered persons, disabled, orphans, and female-headed households. 373,000 children are now in need of psychosocial support. Fifty percent of all medical facilities sustained severe damage and Gaza's emergency and primary health care systems are now overstretched and under-supported. At the same time, border closures have prevented the flow of crucial medical supplies and the transfer of high risk medical cases. Nearly 300 education establishments, from kindergarten to university level, suffered extensive damage and numerous others require repairs having been used as emergency shelters for the internally displaced during the assault.

Essential infrastructure, which was already at breaking point prior to the assault, has sustained severe damage. An estimated 20,000 tons of explosives fired by the Israeli military have left many buildings and large areas of Gaza reduced to rubble. At least 5,000 explosive remnants of war (ERW) are not yet secured or destroyed. Extensive disruption has been caused to water and sanitation networks, energy supplies and facilities, roads and bridges, and the telecommunications system.

Gaza's private sector has suffered both direct damage to property, equipment, stock and raw materials, as well as indirect losses due to closure and reduced economic activity. The agriculture sector has seen widespread destruction of cultivated land, greenhouses, livestock and poultry farms, water wells, irrigation networks, and other productive assets. Seventeen percent of the total cultivated area has been completely destroyed. In the industrial sector, more than 20 percent of Gaza's industrial enterprises and over 4,000 commercial and trade enterprises have been destroyed or damaged. Unemployment is set to rise significantly, defaults in the banking sector may become a problem, and investors, who were already hesitant to invest, are likely to be ever more cautious.

This Early Recovery and Reconstruction plan presents a comprehensive and prioritized response to the overwhelming damage across all sectors and geographic areas in Gaza.

The response in the social sector will require \$701 million. The Government will work with UNRWA and other agencies to extend a safety net to newly impoverished citizens, including through expanded cash transfers, food assistance, and distribution of non-food items. Health services will be restored by rehabilitating destroyed and damaged health infrastructure and equipment. In the education sector, the Government and UNRWA will focus on responding to urgent humanitarian needs amongst students, rehabilitating infrastructure, providing psycho-social and social protection support to students, staff, and families, and returning to education as soon as possible.

In the infrastructure sector, \$1.9 billion will be required for temporary service provision as well as extensive rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Government will prioritize the removal of rubble and removal of ERWs, which pose a critical danger to citizens, particularly children. In the energy sector, additional supplies will be purchased to supplement the now repaired Gaza Power Plant. Access to potable water will be increased initially through provisional supplies, followed by rehabilitation of the destroyed and damaged infrastructure and equipment. Small-scale desalination units will also be developed, and pumps, generators, and chlorine will be distributed. The largest expenditure within the infrastructure sector will be on housing, where temporary housing solutions will be found rapidly for those who have seen their houses destroyed or damaged. Thereafter, repairs and reconstruction will begin. A program to upgrade and develop border crossings will be essential to ensure handling of the construction materials required for the recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The Government will invest \$1.2 billion to rebuild the private sector and increase employment in Gaza, including restoring the productivity of the agricultural, fishing, industrial, and manufacturing sectors and the trades and services sector through rehabilitation, economic stimulation packages, as well as cash-for-work support.

With respect to the governance sector, the National Consensus Government will seize the opportunity presented by its recent formation to harmonize and integrate the previously divided government structures. Maintaining and expanding the operational capacity of the government will need to go hand in hand with the reconstruction of government institutions damaged and destroyed during the assault. These interventions will start immediately and require \$183 million.

The total cost of relief, recovery and reconstruction is estimated at \$4 billion. This is about three times the estimated cost after the 2008 assault and equivalent to 35 percent of the total GDP for the West Bank and Gaza combined. When compared to Palestine's development budget for 2014 of \$316 million, this is a huge shock. However, the Government sees the investment in Gaza as an investment in stability and the viability of a future Palestinian State.

Alongside direct funding for relief, recovery and reconstruction, the continuation of existing budget support for Palestine to Gaza in 2014-2017 will be a vital element for sustaining government functions in the West Bank and Gaza. An estimated \$4.5 billion is required. Therefore the Government urges donors not only to complete the budget support for 2014, but also to commit to budget support for 2015-2017. Without this, proper functioning of the National Consensus Government, as well as recovery and reconstruction in Gaza, will be impossible.

Whilst Gaza's rebuilding will be costly in the short- to medium- term, the Government's vision for Gaza is one of sustainability and self-sufficiency, where Gaza is an integral driver of the a growing Palestinian economy, united with the West Bank and opened up to the rest of the world.

GAZA DAMAGES AND RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS

Recovery and Reconstruction Costs (\$m)

Sector	Sub-Sector	Damage	Scope of Recovery Interventions	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
Social	Social Protection	Increased household vulnerability: 30,000 additional households in need of social protection	Comprehensive support to newly impoverished citizens, including increased coverage of cash transfer program	230	8	80	317
	Health and Psychosocial Support	Total and partial damage to 9 hospitals, 28 clinics and 25 ambulances; 373,000 children in need of psychosocial support	Health care for IDPs; Restocking of drugs and supplies; rehabilitation of infrastructure and equipment; provision of psychosocial support; crisis preparedness	14	159	45	218
	Education and Higher Education	148 schools and eight universities and pre-schools damaged or destroyed; 113 schools used as shelters	Rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed school infrastructure and equipment; school supplies; remedial education; crisis preparedness	1	45	75	121
	Civil Society, CBOs & FBOs	222 NGOs and charities destroyed and damaged; 296 mosques and 3 churches destroyed or damaged	Support to 222 social protection NGOs with damage; Repairs and rehabilitation of mosques and churches	0	4	41	45
			Sub-total		245	215	241
Infrastructure	Rubble & ERW	2.5 million tons of rubble; estimated 5000 ERWs	Removal of rubble and ERWs	0	20	14	34
	Energy	Destruction of Gaza Power Plant; damage to grid, Gaza north substation, and transmission infrastructure	Temporary alternative electricity provision; rehabilitation of grid damages; new transmission system	0	32	153	185
	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	26 water wells and 16 public water supply tanks damaged; 46.8km of water networks and 17.5km of wastewater networks destroyed	Provisional water supply; rehabilitation of destroyed and damaged infrastructure and equipment for water and wastewater, STLV desalination, clearing of solid waste, rehabilitation of land fills	40	80	116	236
	Housing and Shelter	Total damage to some 10,000 housing units Severe damage to some 10,000 housing units; Partial damage to some 40,000 housing units	Rental/hosting allowances; Temporary housing solutions; repairs to damaged houses; rehabilitation and reconstruction of severely and totally destroyed houses	129	143	910	1,182
	Governmental Buildings and Other Public Infrastructure	106 newly destroyed public buildings, damage to UNRWA installations and other public infrastructure	Temporary offices, reconstruction of public buildings, rehabilitation of UNRWA premises, repair of lighting and other installations	0	51	97	149
	Border Crossings	Border crossings damaged or deteriorated	Rehabilitation of border crossings	0	5	50	55
	Roads	Damage of roads	Road repairs	0	0	70	70
	Environment	Unassessed environmental damage	Environmental damage assessment	0	1	0	1
		Sub-total		169	332	1,410	1,911

Sector	Sub-Sector	Damage	Scope of Recovery Interventions	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
Economic	Agriculture	Damage to land, agricultural and fishing assets and infrastructure; losses in production	Compensation for losses; Rehabilitation of damages, restoration of production	0	194	257	451
	Industry and Manufacturing	297 totally damaged and 693 partially damaged industrial enterprises; production losses	Compensation for losses; Repairs and rehabilitation program for industrial sector; Repairs to Gaza Industrial Estate	0	75	284	359
	Trade and Services	1,255 totally damaged and 2,928 partially damaged commercial enterprises; production losses	Compensation for losses; Commercial and services rehabilitation program	0	130	77	207
	Employment	Steep increase in unemployment and poverty	Cash for work and sustainable job creation	0	62	7	69
	Facilitating Investment	Decreased ability and willingness to invest by private sector	Short term to long term financing for private sector companies, capacity building	0	20	130	150
				Sub-total	0	481	754
Governance	Operational Capacity of Central Gov. Institutions	Weakened operational capacities	Allowances to personnel in Gaza, support to reintegration	0	113	0	113
	Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions	Weakened operational capacities	Support to salaries for municipal employees	0	31	0	31
	Rule of Law and Human Rights	Increased need for rule of law services and protection	Support to legal aid and arbitration, human rights and IHL monitoring	0	1	6	7
	Implementation and Coordination	Widespread destruction; weakened operational capacities	Strategic spatial planning; scaled up coordination, implementation, and monitoring capacity of reconstruction and recovery	0	12	20	32
				Subtotal	0	157	26
TOTAL				414	1,184	2,432	4,030

SECTION 1

Setting the Context

The recent assault on Gaza is a reminder of the destabilizing impact and the heavy toll that Israel's decades long occupation exerts on Palestinians and will continue to exert, so long as the goal of an independent Palestinian state in fulfillment of international law and consensus remains elusive. The status quo is unsustainable.

A comprehensive and just peaceful settlement is essential to stopping the continuing, destructive conflict. Only an independent Palestinian state, free of Israeli occupation, can ensure peace, stability and security, side by side with Israel on the 1967 borders.

Unifying all Palestinian territory under one effective government is an imperative for the Palestinian people and for a viable and prosperous state. The formation of the National Consensus Government is an essential first step in that direction and in ensuring national unity. The challenges facing the Government are numerous, spanning complex administrative, financial, legal, economic, and security issues. Added to those is the momentous task of reconstructing Gaza and economic recovery across the whole Palestinian territory, all against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation, high unemployment, decreased financial support, and continued Israeli occupation and colonization.

The success of the National Consensus Government in meeting these challenges is the success of national unity in ensuring the economic and institutional foundations of an independent Palestinian state. The challenges are grave but can be met by the Government, provided that there is strong local and international political support and generous financial and technical support from donor countries, and provided that Israel upholds its obligations under international law and removes its destructive restrictions on Palestinian freedom.

1. **Counting the Losses**
2. **The National Consensus Government: Priority Agenda**
3. **The Vision for Gaza: Integration and Economic Development**
4. **The Private Sector: A Key Role in Economic Revival**



1.1 COUNTING THE LOSSES

In August 2014, Gaza marked the end of the sixth Israeli assault since 2006. Although the 51-day bombardment and invasion has halted, Palestinians in Gaza are still counting their losses: thousands are dead or injured, nearly half a million were displaced, over 110,000 are still homeless, and billions of dollars of damage has been done.

All this is against the backdrop of 66 years of displacement and dispossession, 47 years of military occupation, decades of travel restrictions, and a seven-year blockade, which has crippled the economy and shattered livelihoods. Two of every three people in Gaza were receiving food aid war prior to the recent assault. Poverty rates were up to 39 percent and unemployment had hit 45 percent.

Through the latest assault, which began on July 7, 2014, the Israeli military has once again wrought wholesale damage and destruction to Gaza, surpassing even the aftermath of the December 2008 assault. During the 51-day assault, at least 2,145 people killed and over 11,200 were injured. At least 142 Palestinian families lost three or more members, while 1,500 children lost one or both parents. More children have suffered than ever: at least 581 children were killed. Over 3,436 children were injured, leaving many permanently disabled ¹.

One in four Palestinians in Gaza was forced to flee, and over 60,000 houses were damage or destroyed. Infrastructure and public utilities were severely damaged, including Gaza's only power plant, its water facilities, sanitation, electricity, telecommunication networks, and transportation. Israeli military strikes destroyed government and UN facilities, municipal centers, and public utilities, impeding the provision of basic services to Gaza's 1.8 million inhabitants. The local economy has almost completely collapsed, after the destruction of an unprecedented number of private sector assets and damage to agricultural land and fishing facilities. During the assault, up to 71 percent of the population became food insecure, as prices of basic foodstuff soared by 40 to 179 percent. After seven weeks of assault, most Palestinians in Gaza can no longer meet their most basic needs: earning a livelihood is almost impossible.



Immediate relief is already underway, provided by Government ministries and local and international agencies. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has issued two funding appeals for a combined \$563 million. The requested funds are supporting 47 humanitarian actors in providing immediate relief until December 2014. But humanitarian assistance is just the first phase in the longer effort to help Palestinians in Gaza recover quickly and build back better.

The National Consensus Government has developed this Palestinian National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, in coordination with UN agencies, civil society, and the private sector, to provide a roadmap through the current humanitarian crisis to long-term development. Building on the larger Palestinian National Development Plan, this Plan formulates responses to diverse and urgent sectoral needs to secure the foundation for a prosperous Gaza. Prior to the publication of this Plan, the Government began its Bridging to Recovery Initiative, through which it initiated key priority interventions from the Plan in response to critical needs in Gaza.

Securing a stable future requires an end to this destruction and reconstruction cycle. The siege must be permanently lifted and normal movement of people, trade and economic activity must be restored. It is imperative to ensure that the current recovery and reconstruction leads Gaza onto a sustainable and permanent upward trajectory.

¹ Data on fatalities and casualties are based on preliminary information (as of September 4, 2014) and may change.

1.2 THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT: Priority Agenda

The recent Israeli assault started five weeks after the formation of a National Consensus Government – the first government to administer in both the West Bank and Gaza since 2007. Formed as a result of President Mahmoud Abbas' successful efforts to achieve national reconciliation, this Government aims to institutionally, legally, economically, and socially reintegrate Gaza and the West Bank, as a step towards achieving the aim of an independent and vibrant Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Upon its inception on June 2, 2014, the National Consensus Government was met with strong popular Palestinian support and welcomed by key international stakeholders, including all the Quartet members: the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations.

However, Israel expressed immediate and continued opposition to the National Consensus Government. It significantly limited the new Government's ability to effectively oversee the rehabilitation and integration of the ministries and national institutions, including by preventing the movement of Government members between the West Bank and Gaza.

1.2.1 Institutional and Legal Agenda

Coupled with external challenges caused by the Israeli occupation, the new Government must address complex internal governance tasks, including the complex harmonization of national institutions, civil services, and legal systems. Following seven years of political separation, the full harmonization of Government institutions, civil service, and legal systems between Gaza and West Bank is a historical opportunity that will take time to realize. The overall objective of the Government is to reunite the body politic and strengthen state institutions through the implementation of the reconciliation agreement, with the aim of ensuring a unified Palestinian government effectively governing both Gaza and the West Bank.

At the center of the effort to reunify and harmonize institutions is the issue of pre-2007 employees and the post-2007 staff engaged by the then de facto authority in Gaza. This issue has to be addressed in the short-term while ensuring that the Government is able to function in Gaza and carry out recovery and reconstruction efforts, and without undermining the introducing of a plan for the rationalization of civil service in Gaza and capacity development in the medium-long term. The resolution of these issues is further complicated by external legal challenges and the dire economic situation, in particular the inability of the economy to generate jobs under current circumstances.

Establishing and maintaining law and order under the Government authority requires arrangements in the immediate and short-term for controlling the border crossings; harmonizing the police force; and increasing support to civil defense in response to early recovery efforts. In the medium-long term, security sector reform is essential to ensure the integration of the security forces under a clear command structure, along with capacity-building.

The third major priority is the reintroduction of a unified justice system in Gaza by addressing the status of applicable laws, effect of legal decisions, and reunification of the court system, while continuing the process that was begun prior to 2007 of unifying the different laws, resulting from historic separation and different legal systems between the West Bank and Gaza.

1.2.2 Economic and Fiscal Agenda

The reversal of long term economic deterioration in Palestine, but especially in Gaza, is critical. The Palestinian economy has been strangled by ongoing restrictions and a highly uncertain political outlook. This has been felt even more acutely in recent years as a result of falling foreign aid levels. Growth fell to 1.9 percent in 2013 and is forecast to be negligible in 2014. Since this is below the average population growth of 3 percent, Palestinians are seeing their GDP per capita decline.

This economic picture is even more startling when looking at Gaza, where repeated military assaults have time and again destroyed economic infrastructure and paralyzed economic activity. The impact has been compounded by the severe economic shock produced by the seven-year blockade on exports and imports, which has prevented movement of goods and people

between the West Bank and Gaza and all but eliminated Gaza's export focused private sector. Today, only small shipments of selected products are permitted to other markets through donor-supported projects.

The result is that real GDP per capita in Gaza has stayed largely stagnant since 1994, whilst real GDP per capita in the West Bank has more than doubled. Gaza's contribution to Palestine's total GDP has shrunk, from over a third in the mid-1990s to a quarter now. Pre-assault unemployment hit a staggering 45 percent, as compared to 16 percent in the West Bank, and was high as 70 percent amongst Gaza's youth. Before the latest assault, poverty stood at 38 percent, close to double the level of the West Bank. A further 30,000 households are estimated to have fallen into poverty as a result of the latest assault.

In this context, Gaza's recovery and reconstruction must address not only the immediate economic impact of the assault but also the preexisting structural challenges inhibiting Gaza's development.

Yet, the Government's room for maneuver to address these issues directly is limited. Despite fiscal reforms and improvements, the Government remains reliant on donor support to meet the budget deficit and fund development projects. Additional spending for recovery and reconstruction will put significant fiscal pressure on the budget, at a time when donor flows have been steadily declining, falling by 30 percent since 2008. However, since revenues from Gaza in the short term will not be able to meet more than a small fraction of the additional expenditure – in 2013, only 3 percent of total Government revenues were collected in Gaza, as compared to 43 percent of budget expenditures there - the Government has no option but to look to its partners to support the recovery and reconstruction effort.

FIGURE 1: GDP and Real GDP Growth (USD m, %)





Figure 2: Real GDP per Capita (USD)



SOURCE: World Bank Analysis

1.3 THE VISION FOR GAZA: Integration and Economic Development

Gaza is an integral part of the Palestinian state and its gate to the Mediterranean. Its development is crucial for the viability of the State of Palestine and for the two-state solution. There is no doubt that the success of the National Consensus Government in the reconstruction of Gaza is key to ensuring the stability of Gaza, Palestine, and the region.



Through this Plan, the Government will take - and lead - a series of measures to uphold its responsibility towards Gaza and its residents and ensure rapid improvements to their lives, by working on multiple paths, in cooperation with partners in civil society, the private sector, and donors, while maintaining national ownership.

Addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is the first step towards reconstruction and in enabling the population to live in dignity. Although the material damage can be repaired, the widespread loss of human life as a result of the assault will be suffered by generations to come. The Government's goal is not simply to alleviate the suffering of citizens and repair the physical damage, but also to make substantive improvements in the economic and social situation of Gaza residents, particularly by dealing with the chronic problems of poverty and unemployment.

It is neither sufficient nor acceptable to return to the status quo prior to the July/August assault. This would be tantamount to buying time until the next assault and crisis. Rather, the economy in Gaza must be put on an upward trajectory to achieve development, prosperity, and a dignified life for its population. Accordingly, this Plan is not aimed to "put out fires." Rather, it is the beginning of sustainable development of Gaza, as part of the larger national plan to return the State of Palestine to its rightful political and developmental track.

Developing for the Future: Beyond Reconstruction

At least \$7 billion is required as additional investment to meet long-term development needs. Most of this will be driven by the private sector.

Keystone infrastructure development projects include:

- The Gaza Marine gas project
- The international airport
- The commercial seaport
- A large scale desalination plant
- A north-south water carrier
- Waste water treatment plants

Significant investment is also required to address the existing infrastructure deficit arising from the blockade, including 75,000 housing units, over 270 schools, and two new hospitals.

These projects are not budgeted in the reconstruction plan but will be critical for a thriving Gaza.

The vision of this Government is a Gaza that is fully integrated into the State of Palestine, politically, socially, and economically, and - through it - with the rest of the world. This vision assumes that local and international movement of goods and people is reliable and secure via two safe passages and a permanent territorial link, facilitating increased tourism and a thriving private sector.

Looking beyond the immediate recovery and reconstruction effort, further priority infrastructure projects will be required to address the public and private deficit that has resulted from the blockade and to catalyze Gaza's potential to contribute to Palestinian economic growth. Substantial additional investment is required to provide the infrastructural and economic foundation for Gaza – and Palestine - to thrive.

Under this vision, in five years, a reconstructed Gaza will be open for business, fully engaged with the West Bank economy, and attracting international investment and tourism. In ten years, Gaza will be a rapidly growing, export-oriented economy, with increased trade and domestic prosperity and reduced aid dependency.



1.4 THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A Key Role in Economic Revival

Gaza's businesses have previously been amongst the most productive in Palestine, and its residents have remained dynamic and resilient. Strong opportunities for medium- and long-term growth in Gaza exist in various areas, including the manufacturing, technology, agriculture, tourism, energy, and construction sectors. Gaza enjoys a number of assets and sources of strength, including a substantial young, highly literate, and entrepreneurial labor force, a strategic geographic location in a narrow land corridor between North Africa and the Middle East, coastal assets that could be developed for year-round tourism, and significant, yet-to-be-developed energy resources. Under different conditions, Gaza-based businesses can transform the coastal region and Palestine into a hub for trade of goods and services, servicing markets in Europe and the Middle East.

Palestinian companies will play a key role in the recovery and reconstruction efforts, both as 'implementers' of interventions and recipients of assistance if relevant. The Government will provide the proper enabling environment for the private sector to work efficiently. While implementing this Plan, priority will be given to creating favorable conditions for local economic development through the activation of the private sector. The Government will leverage the private sector via Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure development. It will seek to put in place an enhanced range of financing and insurance mechanisms for those who invest in Gaza. In addition, it will harmonize West Bank and Gaza laws and provide incentives for investment in Gaza through the introduction of specific initiatives.

While various interventions are planned for the revitalization of the private sector, this objective cannot be achieved without ensuring the removal of the blockade and access and movement restrictions, allowing for normal trade between Gaza and the West Bank, neighboring countries, and world markets.

SECTION **2**

PLANNING FOR RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. Preparation of the Plan
2. Guiding Principles
3. Coverage of the Plan
4. Prerequisites for Effective Implementation of the Plan



2.1 PREPARATION OF THE PLAN

This Plan was prepared by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and overseen by the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee. The Committee was formed by the Cabinet of Ministers on 30 July 2014 to oversee the preparation of the Plan for the donor conference in support of reconstruction efforts and budgetary support. It was assisted by a Technical Team composed of representatives of 20 ministries and Government institutions working closely with international organizations, donor countries, and the private sector.

This Plan is based on the Gaza Early Recovery Rapid Needs Assessment, which began on August 14 and was conducted by line ministries in coordination with the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD). Rapid assessments of damage and recommendations for top priority immediate interventions, as well as broader recovery and rehabilitation interventions, were prepared across the four key sectors, in accordance with the National Development Plan: Social Sector; Infrastructure Sector; Economic Sector; and Governance Sector. The damage assessments utilized a range of methodologies including analysis of satellite imagery, site visits, surveys, and interviews on the ground in Gaza, as required. Given the time limitations faced in developing the plans, both the damage valuation and the financing requirements are best estimates, based on the information available at this time.

This Plan also draws upon preliminary needs assessments and response planning by the World Bank and UN agencies, including the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) that was conducted on August 13, 18, and 19 by the UN OCHA and Government ministries in Gaza. The Plan's analysis of existing needs prior to the July/August assault is based on previous studies produced by the Government, the World Bank, and UN agencies.

These assessments are rapid examinations of the challenges faced by residents of Gaza. Further ongoing and planned full-scope assessments will feed the Government's detailed work planning for the interventions described in this Plan. These assessments include an infrastructure damage assessment by UNDP/PAPP and the Government and a Detailed Needs Assessment (DNA) by the European Union, the World Bank, and UNDP/PAPP.

2.2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The Plan is guided by a set of principles that intend to maximize its effectiveness and draw on lessons learned from the previous recovery and reconstruction planning and implementation:

- **Linking recovery plans to Palestine's National Development Plan:** Gaza is an integral part of the Palestinian economy and the Palestinian state. The recovery and reconstruction efforts under this Plan are entirely consistent with national development objectives, which serve to promote coherence in resource allocation, planning and implementation. The implementation mechanism for Gaza reconstruction will be synchronized with the implementation mechanisms for Palestine's broader economic development plans, as laid out in the National Development Plan. To maximize impact and harmonize efforts of a broad range of actors, the Plan will be implemented on the basis of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, as well as transparency and accountability.
- **Government-led with broad-based participation:** The National Consensus Government is leading the planning, execution, and monitoring of the Plan, in cooperation with international and local partners. The Government is already coordinating immediate response to urgent needs in Gaza with international agencies through the Inter-Cluster Coordination System and under the framework of its Bridging to Recovery Initiative. The Government will continue to coordinate efforts of all stakeholders in the early recovery process to avoid duplication of efforts and identify gaps and optimize the use of resources available for sustainable recovery and development. During the implementation process, the people and businesses of Gaza and Palestine will be at the center of early recovery and reconstruction efforts.
- **Using the plan for economic and private sector revitalization:** The Plan aims to rebuild local production capacity. A priority has been given to creating favorable conditions for local economic development through the activation of the private sector. The plan aims to create additional temporary and permanent jobs and secure a key role for Palestinian

companies in the implementation efforts of recovery and reconstruction. In this sense, the private sector and a wide range of civil society organizations are expected to be mobilized as both recipients of assistance and 'implementers' of early recovery and reconstruction interventions.

- **Prioritizing accountability and efficiency in execution:** The Plan's development and design pays particular attention to the need for rapid implementation and strong accountability mechanisms. Government bodies, private sector representatives, and donors will be held responsible for delivery in their key respective areas through a clear, transparent implementation roadmap that forms the basis of a performance management framework by the Government.
- **Focusing on most vulnerable demographic segments:** The Plan focuses on and pays special attention to members of society who are most vulnerable, notably:
 - **Women:** As primary care givers, many women in Gaza are struggling to manage large families, particularly if displaced. There are more female-headed households, due to the death or disabling of male relatives. Pregnant and lactating women have reduced access to health care. Women and girls in shelters struggle to maintain cultural norms of privacy. There is evidence of increased gender-based violence.
 - **Children:** Unacceptable numbers of children were killed (over 23 percent of total casualties) and injured (33 percent of total injuries). Over 1,500 children lost one or both parents, while hundreds of thousands need psychosocial support. Children are also vulnerable to increased violence and abuse and ERWs.
 - **Persons with disabilities:** An estimated 1,000 people are newly disabled. Disabled residents of Gaza face a myriad of urgent challenges, including access restrictions due to widespread destruction and loss of special aids, medicines, and service provision (following the destruction of the only rehabilitation facility). Shelters are not handicapped suited.
 - **Elderly:** Many older residents in Gaza already have physical and mental vulnerabilities, are dependent on now-limited health services, and are less able to cope in damaged housing or shelters. Experiences of multiple hostilities and displacements increases psychosocial needs.
 - **Internally Displaced Person (IDP):** The internally displaced are a newly vulnerable population, particularly those who lost all their assets when their houses were destroyed. There are still 110,000 IDPs, sheltering in schools and with host families. IDPs struggle with inadequate access to basic services, overcrowding, food insecurity, psychosocial needs, and health concerns. Host families, extended communities, and supporting agencies are under strain.

This Plan details interventions under all four sectors that are designed to protect these groups, including expanded social protection, provision of health and psychosocial support, strengthened crisis preparedness, ERW clearance, and targeted availability of legal aid.



2.3 COVERAGE OF THE PLAN

This Plan was developed with the intention to transition from relief efforts to longer-term development needs in Gaza. As a result, it combines critical relief, recovery, and reconstruction needs in order to lay the foundations for long term development.

In its approach the Plan has identified three phases of interventions to respond to the complex, large-scale needs of Gaza and its population: relief, early recovery, and reconstruction.

The immediate focus will be on the continuation of relief efforts already initiated by public and international agencies, especially for IDPs, as well as initiating early recovery interventions. Within a timeframe of six months from the Conference, the plan anticipates the launch of reconstruction efforts. This, however, is contingent on a border regime that reconnects Gaza to the outside world and allows for access of required materials and specialized personnel.

2.3.1 Relief

Timeframe: Immediate – Month 6

Israel's assault has created a complex humanitarian emergency situation that has required an immediate response in order to save lives and prevent severe harm to the population in Gaza. Some of these humanitarian interventions, in particular for IDPs, will need to be sustained over the coming months. These relief interventions focus predominantly on such needs as access to clean water and food, provision of shelter, as well as social protection for those whose homes were destroyed. Many of these interventions are being implemented through the Gaza Crisis Appeal, which was jointly issued by the UN and the Government.

2.3.2 Early Recovery

Timeframe: Month 1 – Month 12

Early recovery is a multi-dimensional process that aims at stabilizing living conditions and preparing the foundations for longer-term reconstruction and development by supporting and generating self-sustaining processes for post-crisis recovery, planning, and financing. Among other things, early recovery interventions will aim to restore delivery of basic services (health, education, social programs, water, electricity, telecommunications); reduce additional risk and vulnerability; remove ERWs; begin to restore livelihoods and shelter (ensure safe and secure environments); and support the return of IDPs. In parallel with this, the Government will work towards strengthening governance functions.



2.3.3 Reconstruction

Timeframe: Month 6 – Ongoing

Beyond the first two response phases, the Plan comprises a major reconstruction effort across all sectors in order to restore Gaza to “normalcy.” Services and infrastructure in Gaza are largely non-functional, due to the massive destruction of public and private infrastructure. It is thus crucial to initiate reconstruction activities as early as possible. Recognizing this, the Plan identifies time-sensitive reconstruction interventions that must be dealt with rapidly and fully, and which will be given top priority during the early reconstruction phases.

The entire reconstruction effort will be underpinned by the aspiration to “build back better.” A mere rebuilding of the status quo or filling gaps left by the assault will not suffice. In this sense, the reconstruction provides an opportunity to revisit the needs of Gaza residents as they stand today, not as they stood yesterday. We must set our aims on ensuring conditions for lasting prosperity and wellbeing and creating an enabling environment for their enterprise and industry to flourish, and for people to live in dignity. We must also ensure that the reconstruction directly addresses key restraints to Gaza’s growth and some of the impending crises.

Bridging to Recovery Initiative


The Government believes that recovery must start immediately, alongside immediate relief activities implemented by ministries and humanitarian agencies, so that the people in Gaza can take an active – not passive – role in rebuilding their lives, homes, and livelihoods.

Therefore, in advance of the donors’ conference, the Government is moving forward with implementing priority early recovery interventions, as part of the first phase of the Gaza Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan. These selected interventions are designed to:

1. Increase availability of basic services in Gaza;
2. Provide temporary housing solutions and facilitate IDPs to return home as soon as possible; and
3. Relieve financial stress and enable the private sector to participate in recovery and reconstruction.

The interventions are a bridge from humanitarian crisis to early recovery. Through these actions, the Government is operationalizing its core strategy for Gaza’s recovery: caring for its citizens, rebuilding its infrastructure, revitalizing its economy, and strengthening its governance.

The Shelter Assistance Package launched by the Government, UNRWA, and UNDP was the first Bridging to Recovery intervention. At the time of writing, the Government was working with the private sector to identify priority interventions for implementation.



2.4 PREREQUISITES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

The success of the plan and the achievement of its objectives depend on several factors. However, based on past experiences, there are three main factors which will determine the success of the plan:

- Unrestricted movement and access of goods and people;
- Availability of sufficient and appropriate funding that can be rapidly deployed on the ground to meet the Plan's activities; and
- Effective ownership and leadership by the Palestinian Government and coordination with its partners to ensure that all efforts and operations are efficient and have maximum impact in the shortest possible time.

The Plan calls for joint commitment between the Government and its partners to ensure that such conditions are met.

2.4.1 A New Arrangement for Movement and Access

Movement and access is essential to the recovery, reconstruction and development of the economy, improvements in people's living conditions, and revival of the private sector. As result, the blockade must be lifted and crossings must be opened and operated effectively to allow for movement of goods and people from and into Gaza.



The issues that will need to be addressed include: Gaza crossings with Israel; access and movement between the West Bank and Gaza; removal of access restrictions to lands near the Green Line in Gaza and the territorial waters; a bilateral Palestinian-Egyptian crossing at Rafah; and commercial seaport and airport in Gaza.

Beyond the right of Palestinians to have the free movement laid out in international law and agreements, unrestricted access and movement is essential to the swift, efficient, and effective implementation of this Plan. The importance of this prerequisite is underlined by the year-long delay of key interventions of the 2009 Recovery and Reconstruction Plan by an Israeli regime of entry restrictions, clearance requirements for construction materials and equipment, and approval processes. A continuation of the current restrictions would significantly impede the progress – and impact – of the interventions described in this Plan. The UN estimates that, if current restrictions on the entry of materials persist, it will take over 18 years to reconstruct the destroyed housing units alone. This would be catastrophic for Gaza.

As a result, this Plan calls for the swift entry of all required construction materials and commodities. The Government welcomes the new UN proposal for facilitating imports for private and government projects as a positive step. But the easing of the restrictions is insufficient. The permitting, review, and control regime must be completely removed as an obstacle to both the reconstruction efforts required to ensure basic service provision as well as the ability of the Gaza economy to generate income, jobs, and opportunities for the population.

2.4.2 Sufficient and Rapidly Disbursed Funding

At \$4 billion, the total cost required for the recovery and reconstruction is three times the estimated cost after the 2008 assault and equivalent to a third of the total GDP for the West Bank and Gaza combined.

The Government faces a challenging fiscal position, resulting first and foremost from the ongoing Israeli occupation and restrictions on movement and access and the Palestinian economy in general. The unprecedented level of damage of the latest assault requires an unprecedented level of financial support. Although the Government will strive to contribute its own financial resources, its constrained fiscal position means that it has no option but to look to local, regional, and international partners to provide the necessary financial support for recovery and rehabilitation to be completed. It will be essential that this can be disbursed quickly and efficiently and in line with the Government's priorities, such that support, services, and infrastructure can be delivered as quickly as possible to the people and businesses of Gaza.

In line with the principle of Government ownership of the strategy and its implementation, and global commitments on aid and development effectiveness, this Plan calls on donors to maximize utilization of national systems. Such an approach will enable a more coherent, programmatic, and long-term approach to development, and lead to much greater Palestinian ownership of the process.

2.4.3 Government Leadership and Effective Co-ordination

This Plan targets all sectors, geographic areas, and institutions affected by the assault. The enormous scale of the damage, the breadth and scope of activities required, and the number of stakeholders involved means that effective management and co-ordination of the Plan's implementation and financing will be critical to reaching targeted goals.

In line with the guiding principles outlined above, the responsibility for overall implementation, coordination, and oversight of the early recovery and reconstruction process will rest with the Government. However, the implementation of the Plan will involve all key ministries and Government bodies, working across all levels of Government and in close cooperation with numerous partners, including national development agencies, local and international NGOs, and the private sector.

The Government will lead the coordination of all stakeholder efforts in order to avoid duplication of efforts, identify gaps, and optimize the use of resources available, as detailed in Section 5.

SECTION **3**

GAZA RAPID ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES AND NEEDS

Conducted in the immediate aftermath of the assault, the preliminary assessment found an unprecedented scale of destruction. All geographic areas of Gaza were affected by the conflict and witnessed aerial bombardment, naval shelling, or artillery fire. Some 44 percent of Gaza was designated by the Israeli military as a buffer zone, from the fenced border with Israel towards the west and in northern Gaza. Due to its densely populated and largely urban environment, all people in Gaza were exposed to the conflict and suffered from damages to vital infrastructure.


Since Gaza was already facing serious humanitarian and developmental challenges, this Plan provides a contextual description of the needs existing before the July/August assault (where relevant), followed by a description of the losses created by the assault.

1. **Social Sector**
2. **Infrastructure Sector**
3. **Economic Sector**
4. **Governance Sector**



2009 - 2014 DENSITY COMPARISON OF DESTROYED AND SEVERELY DAMAGED STRUCTURES IN GAZA

Analysis with Pleiades Data Acquired 14, 27 & 28 th August 2014 and 06 July 2014, WorldView 2 Data Acquired 10 January 2009 and GeoEye 21 January 2009



This map illustrates a density comparison of satellite-detected damages in Gaza Strip, which resulted from recent conflicts in this area in both 2009 and 2014. Damage levels used in this density analysis only concern structures that were destroyed or severely damaged. The 2014 analysis was generated using Pleiades imagery taken 14, 27 & 28th August 2014 and compared with a previous Pleiades image collected 6 July 2014. The 2009 analysis was generated using WorldView 2 and GeoEye imagery taken 10 & 21st January 2009. The 2009 imagery however was reduced resolution so damages may have been underestimated for that time period. This Density comparison is to illustrate the level of damage observed by UNOSAT between the two conflict events. This is a preliminary analysis & has not yet been validated in the field. Please send ground feedback to UNITAR / UNOSAT.

LEGEND

- Capital
- Border Crossing Point
- Primary Road
- International Boundary
- Governorate Boundary
- Armistice Demarcation Line
- Gaza Border Free Fire Zone

Relative spatial density of Building Damages (Destroyed and Severely Damaged)

High Damage

Low Damage

Map Scale for A3: 1:133,500

Satellite Data: Pleiades
 Imagery Dates: 06 July and 14, 27 & 28 August 2014
 Resolution: 50 cm
 Copyright: CNES 2014. Distribution Airbus Defense and Space
 Source: Airbus Defense and Space
 Satellite Image: WorldView-1 & QuickBird
 Resolution: 2m (Reduced Resolution)
 Imagery Dates: 21, 19, 10 & 6 January 2009
 Copyright: DigitalGlobe - US Department of State, Humantarian Information Unit, NextView License
 Other Data: USGS, UNCS, NASA, NGA
 Analysis: UNITAR / UNOSAT
 Production: UNITAR / UNOSAT
 Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.2

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 35N
 Projection: Transverse Mercator
 Datum: WGS 1984
 Unit: Meter

The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown here are not warranted to be error-free nor do they imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. UNOSAT is a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN humanitarian and development agencies and their implementing partners.

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3.1 SOCIAL SECTOR

Seven weeks of bombardment, seven years of blockade, and 25 years of movement restrictions have taken their toll on Palestinians living in Gaza. Social services, including health and education, are overstretched by historical weaknesses and new losses. Poverty, food insecurity, and social vulnerability have rocketed as a result of the mass displacement and destruction of the population. Many households in Gaza can no longer live without external assistance, putting additional pressure on the social protection system.

3.1.1 Social Protection and Social Safety Nets

Prior to the Assault

Decades of border restrictions and repeated assaults have destroyed livelihood opportunities and left most families in Gaza highly vulnerable to further shocks. Eighty percent of people in Gaza depend on social assistance, while social transfers (both cash and in-kind) have become an important source of income for the majority of households, accounting for approximately 16 percent of total household consumption overall and 31 percent among the poorest households prior to the assault. Some 72 percent of people were either food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity, even when taking into account UN food distributions to almost 1.1 million people. For as long as the closure continues, levels of food insecurity will remain high.

Impact of the Assault

Gaza families have shown marked resilience to these stresses, drawing upon their extended community networks to provide informal safety nets. However, the aftermath of this assault will strain those remarkable networks, as food prices soar, new families fall into poverty, and others are pushed further down. Greater food insecurity now exists, exacerbated by massive displacement, destruction in the agriculture/fishery sector, lack of cooking gas, fuel, and cooking utensils, and limited access to water.



Thousands of households have lost income sources (due to the death, disabling, or unemployment of workers) and homes (with tens of thousands of houses destroyed or damaged). Some 1,500 children have lost one or both parents. Over 1,000 newly injured people will be permanently disabled, creating greater social and financial responsibility on their family and social safety nets. Psychosocial trauma is widespread, making recovering from loss a longer process for all, particularly children, bereaved families, and inhabitants of the most impacted neighborhoods.

3.1.2 Health and Psychosocial Well-Being

Prior to the Assault

Even before the latest assault, health services in Gaza were strained by a rapidly increasing population, financial constraints, and scarcity of medical supplies. Medical equipment experienced frequent breakdowns caused by power interruptions and water impurities, among other factors. Most existing health facilities were in need of rehabilitation and upgrading in order to ensure quality services and meet the needs of a growing population.

Impact of the Assault

Over half of Gaza's hospitals and clinics are affected. Fifteen of 32 hospitals are damaged, with three of them closed. Forty-five of 97 primary health care clinics in Gaza are damaged (with four completely destroyed) and 17 are closed, along with two psychiatric clinics and the only rehabilitation center in Gaza. Twenty-five ambulances were destroyed or damaged. Health workers have also suffered seriously: 23 have died and 83 were injured during attacks on ambulances and hospitals.

The current crisis has illuminated the dramatic effects of the massive shortage in the availability of medical supplies and services. In the aftermath of the assault, health services will be in exponentially greater demand, resulting from the large number of injuries, increased public health risks, and massive psychological trauma.

Details of the losses suffered by private and NGO health facilities are not yet known (apart from the destruction of Al-Wafa Hospital, the only rehabilitation hospital in Gaza, counted above), but high reconstruction and re-equipping costs are assumed.



Given the high number of children injured and the relative youth of Gaza residents, the cumulative psychological and physical impact of this and previous assaults represents a serious and long-term responsibility for the health system. Newly injured patients were released prematurely to relieve pressure on hospital services and will require follow-up and further treatment. Over 40,000 pregnant women cannot access antenatal care, which puts their unborn children at risk. The UN estimates that 373,000 children will need direct and specialized psychological counseling, while all students will require some form of psychological assistance.

3.1.3 Education

Prior to the Assault

Education in Gaza has long been characterized by overcrowding and unsafe conditions (approximately 37.3 students per class). The 2008 assault resulted in 217 schools and 60 kindergartens being damaged, including 18 facilities damaged beyond repair: the ongoing blockade has prevented the urgently needed reconstruction of damaged schools and construction of new ones. The annual increase of students in Gaza is nearly four percent (approximately 10,000 new students) and 79 percent of Governmental schools and 88 percent of UNRWA schools operate on a double shift system. In 2012, the UN found that 200 additional schools were needed and another 190 schools would be needed by 2020.

Impact of the Assault

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE) started the school year on September 14, three weeks later than the scheduled August 24. However, damage is widespread and severe in the primary and secondary education sector across

government and UNRWA systems: 26 schools were destroyed, 122 schools were damaged, and a further 113 schools were used as shelters for IDPs. In total, over 559,000 students have been affected by damage to Gaza's schools and universities. Damage was greatest in the Gaza governorate, particularly in the east, where nine schools were destroyed and 39 damaged.

Damage was also significant in pre-school, private, and higher education facilities, although detailed assessments are not yet complete. Half of all universities in Gaza are damaged, including Al Aqsa University, Palestine Technical College, the Technology and Science University, and Islamic University.



The impact on students will be long-term and will result in further over-crowding and potentially irregular schedules for Government and UN students, who may have to travel further – and at greater cost – to alternate schools. Damaged facilities are likely to require three to ten months for reconstruction or rehabilitation. Over 56,000 IDPs remain sheltering in 41 UNRWA schools and two government schools.

Educational resources, technologies, supplies, and hygiene facilities were damaged or destroyed on a large-scale, particularly following the destruction of the MOEHE warehouse: replacing them will be complicated by shortages of fuel and materials, leading to sharp increase in educational costs. Families of students who have lost their houses would need support in order to ensure the availability of school uniforms and stationary for their children. Psychosocial support of affected students will also be essential.

3.1.4 Civil Society, Community-Based Organizations, and Faith-Based Institutions

Prior to the Assault

Civil society organizations (CSO) have long had a strong presence in Palestine. CSOs have played a key role in service delivery – especially in the health sector.

Impact of the Assault

Full details of the damages inflicted on the civil society in Gaza are not yet available, although an estimated 222 social protection organizations and charities were damaged.

Places of worship were also damaged, including a number of historical significance. In total, 296 mosques were affected (with 73 completely destroyed), three churches were damaged, and 10 cemeteries were damaged.



3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE

Residents of Gaza are struggling to cope without secure supplies of water, sanitation, and power. Nearly half a million people were displaced by danger or housing loss. Around 110,000 people will remain displaced long-term. The implications of the damage left by the July/August assault are vast, in financial cost, human suffering, and public health. However, the scale of the damage also brings attention to the chronic vulnerabilities of infrastructure in Gaza. As numerous UN reports have highlighted, the water, sanitation, and energy sectors are close to failure, potentially making Gaza an unlivable place by as soon as 2020.

3.2.1 Clearance of Rubble and Explosive Remnants of War

Impact of the Assault

The Israeli military shelled and bombarded Gaza for seven weeks from sea, air, and land. Over 2.5 million tons of rubble are spread across Gaza, particularly in areas that experienced the heaviest bombardment, such as Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia and Shujaiyeh (Gaza City), Khuza'a, and Rafah.

An estimated 20,000 tons of explosives were fired by the Israeli military: some 5,000 ERWs have yet to be secured, according to the UN. As a result, ERWs currently pose a major threat to children, farmers, IDPs returning home, reconstruction workers, and humanitarian workers. UNMAS estimates that 713,000 Gaza residents could be affected and that children are at greatest risk, with an estimated 450,000 in danger of accidentally triggering an ERW. Well-placed concerns about ERWs are likely to deter IDPs from returning to their homes, if still standing. Rubble clearance will also be complicated by hidden ERWs.

The Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit in Gaza has already identified probable location of ERWs and begun removing and disarming ERWs, when possible. In Khan Younis alone, 1,800 disabling and destroying missions took place during the assault. The EOD Unit continued working throughout the assault, without specialized tools or safety equipment: four EOD staff (including the unit head) were killed, along with two journalists, in August while attempting to disarm an ERW.

3.2.2 Energy

Prior to the Assault

Gaza was suffering from an electricity deficit prior to the July/August assault, as a result of fuel scarcity, inadequate infrastructure, power leakage, limited financial resources, and impediments on sector development caused by Israeli occupation and restrictions. With the power supply at 200MW of the required 450MW prior to the assault, daily power cuts were normal (lasting as long as 16 hours in certain areas), restricting private sector operation and affecting the provision of essential services such as water supply, sewage treatment and removal, and the functioning of health services. Upgrades to the network, improved fuel resources, and additional power lines were already critically needed to meet current needs alone. Yet, without strategic interventions to create sustainable capacity growth, the energy crisis will continue: by 2020, Gaza's energy supply will have to at least double to meet demand.



Impact of the Assault

Less than 30 percent of electricity demand is now being met. Damaged assets include the main storage warehouse, network structures, the north Gaza substation, and the only local electricity power plant. The Gaza Power Plant's fuel treatment and storage facilities were completely destroyed. In addition, only 10 percent of the electricity received is utilized due to the extensive damage sustained by the internal distribution network. For instance, severe network damage means that, in eastern Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, Khuza'a and eastern of Rafah, the majority of households there are not likely to receive electricity.

3.2.3 Water and Waste Water

Prior to the Assault

The water and waste water sectors were at crisis point prior to the assault. Gaza relies almost completely on its coastal aquifer, which is being over-abstracted and infiltrated by sewage, pollution, and sea-water. The aquifer could become unusable as early as 2016 and only seven percent of operating water wells produce potable water according to WHO standards. In general, only 10 percent of water in Gaza is now potable. Although the water network coverage is almost universal, its distribution efficiency was down to 55 percent. As a result, access to clean water was already limited, with average consumption at 70-90 percent of the global WHO daily standard.

Impact of the Assault

The attacks severely impacted the water, sanitation and hygiene sectors, leaving at least 450,000 people vulnerable to serious public health risks. Primary water pipelines, water reservoirs, house connections, sewage pipelines, wastewater treatment plants, and sewage pumping stations were directly targeted and damaged. Well pumping stations, the waste water treatment plants, and the desalination process are now disabled by electricity and fuel shortages. Between 20 and 30 percent of water and sewage networks remain damaged, mostly in Khan Younis, and 12 percent of wells were destroyed or damaged, mostly in Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, and Deir Al-Balah.



Around 90 percent of water (and sanitation) facilities rely on electric power for pumping water to the population. Water provision is now cut or severely restricted, with residents of North Gaza and Khan Younis most affected. Between 30 to 50 percent of household water storage capacity was damaged and many households lack the electricity or pumps to fill water storage when water is available. Despite rapid repair by the Coastal Water Management Utility (CWMU) of 80 percent of priority repairs to infrastructure, between 20 to 30 percent (450,000 people) are unable to access municipal water. Costs of desalinated and tinkered water have increased, further limiting access to water for vulnerable families and creating financial stress for the larger population, which was already dependent on private water vendors prior to the assault.

Sanitation is also a priority: services are damaged and the massive number of IDPs are overwhelming the public shelters or their shared accommodations. This represents a serious imminent public health risk, with infectious diseases reportedly on the rise, particularly amongst IDPs. Only 50 percent of wastewater is treated and is flowing into the sea and streets or mixing with water, posing a severe environmental and public health threat. Although solid waste services are functioning in most areas, collection is infrequent and residents are dumping waste within their communities. Lack of spare parts and fuel for operation and maintenance are likely to cause further service disruptions.

3.2.4 Shelter and Housing

Prior to the Assault

Gaza was already facing a housing shortage of over 75,000 units, as a result of a rapidly growing and young population, import restrictions on construction materials, and significant damage and destruction during previous assaults.

Impact of the Assault

Further severe stress was caused by the July/August assault, which affected around 60,000 housing units (or 18 percent of Gaza's housing stock). Around 20,000 housing units were totally destroyed or severely damaged. A further 40,000 housing units were partially damaged, impacting a further 260,000 people.

One in four Gaza residents were displaced by the Israeli bombardment, forced into public shelters or shared accommodation: of that number, over 68 percent were displaced by housing damage. Weeks after the ceasefire, as this report goes to print, some 110,000 IDPs remain in public shelters or with host families.

Type of damage	Destroyed	Severe Damage	Partial damage	Total Units
Description	Totally destroyed houses, beyond repair. Need demolition and reconstruction.	Severe damages in essential parts of house. Uninhabitable until major rehabilitation work is undertaken.	Major or minor damages in part of house. House can be inhabited but needs repairs	
North Gaza	2,300	2,300	8,000	12,600
Gaza	2,900	2,900	15,000	20,800
Middle Gaza	1,500	1,500	6,000	9,000
Khan Younis	2,000	2,000	7,000	11,000
Rafah	1,300	1,300	4,000	6,600
Total	10,000	10,000	40,000	60,000

3.2.5 Government Buildings and Other Public Infrastructure

Impact of the Assault

The impact of the July/August assault was universal on public infrastructure. Municipalities, central government authorities, and UNRWA report destruction and damage to facilities, and critical operational infrastructure and equipment. In total, 78 public buildings were destroyed, adding to the 28 public buildings destroyed in previous assaults.

3.2.6 Border Crossings

The 2006 Access and Movement Agreement (AMA) identified six border crossings for commercial and traveler use, as well as the international airport and commercial seaport. Currently, only three border crossings are functional, with minimal movement allowed across all three. Other crossings and access (including the safe passage to the West Bank) are not open, and their facilities range from being under-developed, damaged, deteriorated, or destroyed. This non-compliance with the AMA has suppressed economic growth and effectively imprisoned 1.8 million people.

3.2.7 Roads

Impact of the Assault

The municipal road networks suffered the most damage. One in every two kilometers of regional roads in Gaza were already unpaved or damaged, as a result of damage in previous Israeli incursions or because rehabilitation was hindered by the blockade. Further damage to roads during the assault impeded rapid response and civilian evacuation and continues to constrain provision of basic and critical services. Khan Younis, Gaza, and North Gaza experienced the greatest road damage respectively.

3.3 ECONOMIC SECTOR

The private sector in Gaza has undergone more than a decade of strife since 2000. The nearly complete halt in imports to and exports from Gaza after 2007 resulted in a dramatic drop in manufacturing and agricultural outputs, as most items essential to private sector revitalization remain on banned lists and are inaccessible.

Although the blockade was slightly eased in 2010 to allow imports of consumer goods and construction materials for donor funded projects, restrictions on imports of construction and raw materials to the private sector are still fully in place; similarly, exports to the West Bank and Israeli markets, which traditionally absorbed around 85 percent of Gaza's exports, are still restricted. Combined with the destruction of the tunnels that were the only other unofficial supply line for Gaza (enabling an estimated \$700 million annual trade), the blockade has effectively suffocated the economy. Significantly, engagement in innovative and business-upgrading activities has dropped among Palestinian firms in recent years, driven primarily by diminished levels of activity among Gaza firms.

The most recent assault has been a further, severe shock. Thousands of factories and commercial establishments are damaged or destroyed and the agricultural and fishing industries are in ruins. Unemployment, which was already at unacceptably high levels, has been exacerbated. Sustainable recovery will require significant efforts to generate private sector-led growth.



3.3.1 Agriculture and Fishing

Prior to the Assault

Since the 1990s, agriculture in Gaza has been in a steady and serious decline. While Israeli military restrictions on access and movement have been destructive in all economic sectors, the agricultural sector has been one of the worst hit. Seventeen percent of Gaza is largely off-limits, including 35 percent of its agricultural land, while more than 3,000 fishermen do not have access to 85 percent of the maritime areas agreed in the [1995 Oslo Accords](#). As a result, fewer crops are now grown and the fish catch has decreased dramatically. Overall, land and sea restrictions affect 178,000 people, 12 percent of Gaza residents, and result in annual estimated losses of almost \$80 million from agricultural production and fishing.

Impact of the Assault

The agricultural sector was directly targeted by during the July/August assault: 30 percent of agricultural land was damaged. Much of the best agricultural land was part of the operational area of the Israeli military and is assumed to be contaminated by ERWs. These will need to be cleared before farmers can be confident of working their land safely.

An estimated 40 percent of livestock died: half the poultry stock and hundreds of sheep and cows perished in the bombardment or from lack of feed and water, when owners could not access their farms. A large number of the irrigation wells, irrigation systems, greenhouses, productive trees, post-harvest facilities, and agricultural equipment were also targeted and destroyed. The areas most affected in the agricultural sector are Khan Younis, followed by Rafah, Gaza, North Gaza, and Middle Gaza.

The fishery sector was also greatly affected: fishermen could not access the sea for the duration for the assault and many boats were destroyed. In the first month of the assault, nine percent of the annual catch was lost, impacting the already limited, protein-low Gaza diet.

3.3.2 Industry and Manufacturing



Prior to the Assault

The industrial sector in Gaza is mainly comprised of small and medium sized firms representing 94 percent of the total industrial enterprises in Gaza. Over 50 percent of enterprises across the industrial, furniture, garment, textile, and agribusiness sectors were closed over recent years due to a combination of physical damage inflicted by the conflicts and deteriorating market conditions caused by trade restrictions. The Palestinian Federation of Industries (PFI) reports that the number of industrial workers dropped from 350,000 in 2005 to less than 15,000 in mid-2013, which is a strong indication of the shrinking industrial base in Gaza. Electricity has become the top binding constraint reported by Palestinian firms in Gaza, second only to political instability. The blockade halted Gaza's exports, virtually ending the operations of key export sectors: the number of truckloads that currently exit Gaza is less than four percent of the pre-blockade 2006 rate and one percent of the 2000 rate, averaging one truck only every two days in 2013 and 2014.

Impact of the Assault

Gaza's weakened industrial firms suffered both direct and indirect losses as a result of the assault. In total, 990 industrial enterprises were impacted: 297 factories and workshops were destroyed and 693 were partially damaged. The construction industry suffered the biggest losses, making up 28 percent of damaged industries, while the greatest concentration of damage was in Gaza City, where 68 percent of the damaged industries were located. Many industrial facilities had to suspend their production because of power and fuel shortages. In turn, the closure of facilities and suspension of production resulted in dismissal of workers because firms were unable to pay wages.

Although companies in the Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE) were not directly targeted, infrastructure at the GIE was damaged, restricting the operations of firms within the estate even after the assault.

3.3.3 Trade and Services

Prior to the Assault

Trade activities in Gaza are extremely difficult under strict Israeli measures and full control over the crossings. This has deprived firms of access to West Bank and international markets. The internal trade sector in Gaza is mainly comprised of micro and small enterprises representing 99 percent of the total commercial enterprises. The trade sector is well connected with agriculture and manufacturing. Without a scale up in these sectors, retail and wholesale activities will not be able to flourish.

Israeli movement and access restrictions have limited the telecommunications sector for years, including on the launch of a second Palestinian mobile phone operator, the import of equipment, and the movement of personnel into and out of Gaza.

International tourism has become a moribund industry due to restrictions on entry into Gaza, although domestic (internal) tourism has grown, as Palestinians seek leisure within the confines of the blockaded borders of Gaza. However, this is insufficient to occupy the 15 hotels.

Impact of the Assault

Nearly 4,200 commercial enterprises suffered during the assault: around 1,255 were destroyed and 2,928 were partially damaged. Over 90 percent are small stores.

The scale of damage and destruction to telecommunications (telephony and internet) infrastructure is reported to be significant, with the damage mainly in the fixed line network. Rehabilitation will depend on access to materials from the external market and entrance of specialized personnel into Gaza. The mobile communications network is seriously disrupted in a number of Gaza districts: 225 stations have no power supply and 14 stations were destroyed.

The assault has dealt a further blow to the tourism industry. Many of important sites were damaged during the July/August assault, including three submitted by the Government for addition to UNESCO's list of World Heritage sites.

Five bank branches were damaged during the bombardment. The degree of indirect losses to the banking sector will become clear as the situation stabilizes and banks determine which customers will be unable to pay back their loans, and the impact of this on total non-performing loans.

3.3.4 Employment and Livelihood

Prior to the Assault

Unemployment was at 45 percent (after a sharp increase from 28 percent following the end of the tunnel trade in mid-2013): nearly 70 percent of young people were unemployed.

Impact of the Assault

While final figures are not yet available about the level of unemployment post-assault, the widespread devastation of the economic sector and the prolonged suspension of work indicate that the rate of unemployment has jumped significantly and will remain higher than the pre-assault rate for a prolonged period.

3.4 GOVERNANCE SECTOR

A functional and unified public administration under the National Consensus Government is pivotal to the success of the recovery and reconstruction plan, to stabilizing Gaza, and to providing services to its citizens. Within the period of this Plan, the Government, in parallel to leading and implementing the recovery and reconstruction effort, will need to assume effective authority and sole governmental responsibilities in Gaza; consolidate authority over ministries and Government agencies and reintegrate them with national institutions; harmonize and rationalize the civil service in Gaza; and gradually assume security responsibilities as part of a comprehensive security sector reform, starting with the assumption of policing responsibilities under the authority of the Government to maintain civic law and order.

The scale of destruction and massive displacement as a result of the Israeli assault could potentially lead to destabilized security, if immediate relief and early recovery are not provided adequately. Accordingly, the first objective in the short-term is to ensure the operations of central and local government institutions for relief, early recovery, and reconstruction of Gaza. Achieving this will require a temporary solution for the personnel engaged by the previous de facto authorities post-June 2007 who have not received regular payments for a prolonged period of up to one year. This temporary mechanism will be limited in time and function in parallel to beginning the process of harmonization and rationalization of the civil service, aimed at determining the retention and retraining of existing civil servants who are not currently in active duty and the possible integration of personnel who were recruited over the past seven years by the previous de-facto authorities, following the determination of their status.

3.4.1 Operational Capacity of Central Government Institutions

The consolidation of the public administration under the authority of the National Consensus Government requires a careful examination of available modalities within the existing fiscal limitations of the budget. The civil service employees in Gaza have not been able to assume their responsibilities yet and return to their work. In addition, those employed by the previous de facto authorities after June 2007 have not received regular payments for months, and their status remains undefined. These include some 10,000 personnel in the education and health sectors, who perform vital social services for the population. This is in addition to several thousand civil police officers and members of the security apparatus. This situation is not tenable and threatens the operational capacity of central government institutions to implement early recovery and reconstruction programs.

The consolidation of the public administration and service provision will further be complicated by the immediate impact of the assault, which resulted in the destruction of public buildings, along with government equipment and vehicles.

3.4.2 Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions

Municipalities are direct providers of essential daily services to their citizens and as such play a key role in recovery and reconstruction efforts.

Municipalities to a large degree depend on revenues for services and municipal fees and taxes. In impoverished Gaza, however, citizens are not able to pay these service fees and taxes. As a result, municipal personnel have not received regular payments for months, and currently only core personnel is reporting to work. While conditions vary slightly between municipalities, the operational capacity of municipalities has been compromised during the most critical period. Especially in the current recovery and reconstruction phase, it is vital that municipalities work at their maximum capacity.

Municipalities have also suffered direct losses. Municipal facilities and equipment have been destroyed and damaged throughout Gaza, though Rafah, Beit Lahia, and Gaza City incurred most of the damages. These damages further undermine the operational capacity of the affected municipalities.

3.4.3 Rule of Law and Human Rights

The weeks of shelling and bombardment have compromised rule of law and human rights in Gaza beyond the assault. Law enforcement infrastructure, courts, prosecution departments, and family courts, as well as the only women's shelter were also destroyed or damaged. The Palestinian Bar Association lost eight of its lawyers.

While enforcement capacities have been weakened, protection needs have increased substantially, including at IDP centers.

Considering the massive loss of lives and property and the corresponding need to find alternative shelter, it is expected that rule of law institutions will be confronted with a strong increase in caseloads related to land, property, and housing rights, as well as with personal status, heritage, and custody issues.

The disproportional killing of civilians and the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure all point out to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law by Israel. Human rights organizations based in Gaza and the West Bank have mobilized their resources and are cooperating in documenting and investigating violations of International Humanitarian Law. These activities are vital for ensuring accountability and need to be conducted at the very early stage, at times ahead of the removal of rubble and other damages.

3.4.4 Implementation and Coordination

As noted above, widespread destruction and government transitions have impacted the capacity and resources of the Government. There is a need to upgrade the operational capacity of central government institutions to implement this Plan.

SECTION **4**

RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION INTERVENTIONS

Relief activities are already underway to respond to humanitarian needs and increase availability of essential services. The interventions outlined below build upon ongoing and planned relief activities and are designed to be an effective bridge between current critical needs and a more sustainable response to new and chronic needs in Gaza. This is particularly important because of the decline in the quality of services and economic conditions before the July/August assault.

In order to address the needs of people in Gaza in an integrated and coordinated way, priority interventions must ensure that sectoral and sub-sectoral needs are considered in relation to each other. Interventions in one sector will reinforce those in others. For example, an improved supply of energy will increase availability of water and sanitation services, improving living conditions (particularly for IDPs), reducing public health risks, and protecting the vulnerable (such as women and children). Energy is also critical to reviving the private sector, which will be an important supply and employment resource during recovery and reconstruction. The sequencing and prioritization of recovery and reconstruction activities recommended below is a result of the careful consideration of the various sub-sectors of the Plan.

1. **Social Sector**
2. **Infrastructure Sector**
3. **Economic Sector**
4. **Governance Sector**



4.1 SOCIAL SECTOR

Response in the social sector will be quick and significant. Social protection programs are being expanded to accommodate the newly poor and vulnerable. Education and health services will be strengthened to cope with the systemic shocks triggered by the assault and the increased demand on services.



4.1.1 Social Protection and Social Safety Nets

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
\$230m	\$8m	\$80m	\$317m

Tens of thousands of families are struggling to cope in the aftermath of destruction, death, and financial loss. Over 30,000 households (around 172,500 individuals) are estimated to have newly fallen into poverty and food insecurity, increasing the already substantial number of people dependent on aid. There is an immediate need to significantly scale up the Government's existing social protection programs as a result, including:

- Cash Transfer Program for 95,000 households (up from a pre-assault 65,000 household level)
- Health insurance coverage for 70,000 households (up from 40,000 household level)
- Regular food assistance (through WFP) for 55,000 households (up from 25,000 households)

These scaled up programs are expected to last up to two years.

A second exceptional food distribution will be provided to all households not already receiving regular food assistance (estimated to include 730,000 households). Short-term assistance will also be provided to newly displaced and conflict-affected refugee families, including food parcels to IDPs in shelters and non-food items (NFI) to IDPs and refugee families.

Early recovery interventions will seek to create or strengthen longer-term support, including raising awareness of and responding to the emerging needs of refugee women, providing reimbursement of medical and burial expenses, providing new orphans with sponsorship cash allowance, and exempting 140,000 students from school fees (up from 120,000). Child protection systems will be strengthened, including child protection services, helplines, referrals, and resilience building activities, particularly in response to children living in displaced families.

Longer-term assistance projects will aim to strengthen vulnerable households (e.g., households headed by women or including the disabled) by supporting income-generating projects and encourage newly disabled people to re-integrate through vocational training and home adaptations.

Protection for women against gender-based violence (GBV) will be increased through multiple interventions, including a rapid assessment, mapping of available services for women and girls, strengthening of protection resources (e.g., safe places, protection committees, and referral pathways), and awareness raising amongst women and their community about GBV and specialized services.

A new assessment of vulnerability in Gaza will also be conducted, based on a survey of household expenditure and consumption.

4.1.2 Health and Psychosocial Well-Being

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
\$14m	\$159m	\$45m	\$218m

In the aftermath of the assault, health services are overburdened, under-resourced, and still very much in demand. Interventions must focus on ensuring hospitals, clinics, and other health providers are able to respond, now and in the long-term. Primary health care services are crucial to prevent outbreaks of diseases and – in the relief phase - will be provided to IDPs in shelters, particularly new mothers.

Health facilities will be provided with medication and medical supplies to replenish stocks exhausted during the July/August assault. Eight hospitals, 21 primary health care clinics, two psychiatric clinics and a clinic for the handicapped need repair and re-equipping, following damage to physical infrastructure, equipment, and furniture. Specialized medical equipment also needs repairing or replacing: electromechanical, medical equipment, and spare parts will also be provided, along with 25 ambulances. During the recovery phase, the health system will be strengthened by analyzing and responding to needs in health human resource, health information, medical stocks, non-communicable disease care standards, and emergency preparedness. The cooling chain for vaccines will be restored, with capacity improvements, and provide a new stock of vaccines.

Psychosocial support will also be a key early recovery intervention, including for displaced families, including young girls and elderly people, 100,000 children whose families lost their homes, new widows and women whose household has lost income-earners, GBV survivors, 1,000 newly disabled, 1,500 new orphans, and UNRWA staff who worked during the assault.

Specialized protection mechanisms will be established to serve 60,000 highly vulnerable children with psychosocial services. Schools will also serve as a mechanism for responding to trauma amongst children, including awareness-raising and counselling sessions for school teachers, students, staff, and school safety committees; school-based activities to promote non-violence, child protection, and psycho-social support by teachers and counselors; and psycho-social support to pupils and teachers to improve coping skills.

During the reconstruction phase, five primary health clinics and two rehabilitation centers destroyed during the assault will be reconstructed and equipped. Finally, a comprehensive review of health sector emergency preparedness and response plans will be carried out.

4.1.3 Education



Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
\$1m	\$45m	\$75m	\$121m

With half the Gaza population under 18, education can be used as a primary mechanism for social and psychosocial stabilization throughout Gaza. Schools can provide much needed structure and normalcy for children, who are suffering from direct or indirect trauma. Damage was done across the entire educational spectrum: from pre-schools to universities. There is a massive scale of rebuilding, repairing, and re-equipping that must be done in governmental, UN, private, and NGO schools and universities.

Schools will cater for students with existing or new disabilities (caused during the assault) who either have lost their specialized equipment (e.g., mobility aids or hearing aids) in the assault or have new needs. Emergency education will also be provided to children living in IDP shelters.

As the school year starts, new school supplies (e.g., uniforms, bags, and stationery) are being distributed to students, with a focus on internally displaced students.

To promote educational early recovery, 144 government and UNRWA schools, one private school, three pre-schools, and four universities will be repaired and re-equipped. A further twenty-two governmental schools, two pre-schools, and two university buildings will need to be reconstructed.

Since school capacity was already insufficient in Government and UNRWA schools, reconstruction plans will aim at creating sufficient capacity for both current and future students.

Therefore, reconstruction plans will aim at creating sufficient capacity for both current and future student population. UNRWA will also build transitional schooling facilities for refugees. A number of programs will be introduced to strengthen educational delivery and respond to the aftermath of the assault.

4.1.4 Civil Society, Community-Based Organizations, and Faith-Based Institutions

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$4m	\$41m	\$45m

Civil society organizations suffered heavily during the assault with over 220 organizations experiencing significant damage. These charities and NGOs will receive a one-time payment to help them re-establish their services to their 180,000 beneficiaries.

Nearly 200 mosques will be rehabilitated and 73 mosques will be reconstructed. Reconstruction will also be undertaken for a range of archaeological and cultural sites.

4.1.5 Summary of Interventions in Social Sector

Interventions & Estimated Costs by Phase			
Sub-Sector	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cash assistance and health insurance for an additional 30,000 newly vulnerable households Food and non-food assistance to IDPs and non-IDPs (*all to continue for full duration of plan) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reimbursement of medical and burial expenses Exemptions from tuition fees for students Strengthening protection for women and children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to permanently disabled Livelihood support to vulnerable households Strengthening GBV protection Vulnerability assessment
	<i>Estimated Cost: \$230m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$8m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$80m</i>
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency repairs on essential equipment and vehicles Primary health care services for persons in shelters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restocking of medication and medical supplies Rehabilitation of 8 damaged hospitals and 24 clinics Replacement of medical equipment, spare parts, and 25 ambulances Restoration of cooling chain for vaccines Expanded psycho-social support Improved health services for refugees and children Health system strengthening 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of destroyed hospital Reconstruction of 5 destroyed clinics Emergency preparedness
	<i>Estimated Cost: \$14m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$159m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$45m</i>
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of aids for disabled students Emergency education in shelters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of 145 schools Rehabilitation of 4 universities Rehabilitation of 3 pre-schools Provision of schooling supplies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of 24 heavily damaged schools and pre-schools Reconstruction of 2 university buildings Crisis preparedness Remedial education Transitional schooling facilities
	<i>Estimated Cost: \$1m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$45m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$75m</i>
Civil society		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of damaged NGO infrastructure Support to 222 social protection NGOs with partial damages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of destroyed NGO infrastructure Rehabilitation of 196 mosques Reconstruction of 73 mosques Rehabilitation of archaeological and cultural sites
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$4m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$41 m</i>
ESTIMATED SUB-SECTOR COST	\$245m	\$215m	\$241m
TOTAL SECTOR COST		\$701m	

4.2 INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR

Immediate response, as part of the relief and early recovery effort, is essential to ease individual suffering and increase access to basic services. However, given that Gaza's infrastructure was already at breaking point prior to the assault, short term fixes cannot evolve into long-term solutions. Equally, the infrastructure reconstruction effort cannot simply be a re-building of pre-existing infrastructure. Instead, reconstruction efforts will be informed by long-term, cross-sector infrastructure planning that will establish effective integrated infrastructure networks as the basis for long-term sustainable social and economic development.

A critical pre-requisite for infrastructure development is access and movement. Even the most urgent need or the most strategic priority cannot be met if the blockade is not ended. Without materials and fuel, networks cannot be mended, houses cannot be built, and a healthy and sustainable future cannot be assured.



4.2.1 Clearance of Rubble and Explosive Remnants of War

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$20m	\$14m	\$34m

Two and a half million tons of rubble need to be removed, the mass clearance can be divided between the early recovery phase and the reconstruction phase. Although it is not suitable for rebuilding, the rubble removed during the reconstruction phase can be reused for road rehabilitation, curbs stones, and road paving. Large chunks of concrete can be reused as wave breakers for the fishing harbor.

Given the high tonnage of munitions used during this assault and the December 2008 assault, there is a significant risk that ERWs will be hidden in the rubble. Activities will include rapid assessments, emergency ERW (and explosive hazards) risk education for civilians and humanitarian actors in highly impacted neighborhoods, as well as the oversight and monitoring of marking, collection, and disposal of ERW by the Police EOD teams as and when the security and political situations allow. Activities would begin in the early recovery phase and continue through the reconstruction phase.

4.2.2 Energy

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$32m	\$153m	\$185m

A steady and sufficient supply of electricity is essential to Gaza's recovery. Immediate repairs are needed to the badly damaged grid. A temporary storage facility will be found for electrical equipment, until the construction of a new main storage facility for electrical equipment is completed as part of reconstruction.

An initial repair of the Gaza Power Plant has been completed to allow for its operation. In addition, planned early recovery will see the restoration of the main power lines for supply from Israel and the provision of electrical materials to repair networks. In parallel, the possible expansion of supply of electricity through existing lines from Egypt is being explored. Other potential short-term alternatives are being evaluated, which include a connection to a floating naval power station.



However, the pre-existing energy deficit requires more than an attempt to return to the cost-inefficient status quo. In the long-term, the Government will promote the cost-saving conversion of the Gaza Power Plant to natural gas from industrial diesel by the private sector.

4.2.3 Water and Waste Water

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
\$40m	\$80m	\$116m	\$236m

While pressing health risks justify immediate and primary focus on repairs, the water and sanitation sector is facing serious systemic failings that must be addressed to ensure sustainable water sources and sanitation systems in the future. Long-term interventions are essential to enable Gaza's water and sanitation services to accommodate citizen and environmental demands now and in the future.

Immediate interventions will include the provision of mobile pumps and generators (with spare parts and fuel) for pumping water and wastewater. Access to clean water will be improved through the provision of chlorine to disinfect water. IDPs will receive water for drinking and domestic use through water trucks and bulk water storage units and will have access to new sanitation installations. Water and sanitation support for IDPs will continue through the early recovery phase.

At the same time, the Palestine Water Authority will upgrade its operational capacity by procuring new machinery, equipment, and vehicles to replace damaged or destroyed assets. Response to this operational need can be both emergency and early recovery, but assistance will begin immediately to support rapid system repairs.

Urgent repairs have been done, including the restoration of the Rafah Waste Water Treatment Plant pipeline to the sea, which stopped partially treated waste water seeping into ground water wells. However, significant numbers of water and sanitation systems, desalination units, wastewater pumping stations, and wastewater treatment plants need repair, as part of the early recovery effort.

Municipal public roads, water and sanitation services, and electrical installations will be repaired to facilitate early recovery and protect public health, particularly of the most vulnerable. Transitional solid waste dumps will be cleared.

In a later phase, water wells, networks, and tanks, and sanitation networks will be completely rebuilt, particularly in areas of widespread destruction, including in Beit Hanoun, Jabalia, Shujaiyeh, eastern Rafah, and the eastern Khan Younis villages. Those areas need a complete water and waste water infrastructure solution, which may require a re-design of the networks based on the new population in the area.

During recovery and reconstruction phases, additional supply of potable water will be provided through supply of more water from Israel of up to additional 10 MCM per year.

Longer-term responses to the challenges of clean water and sanitation for the people of Gaza must be funded. In light of the current demand for fresh water and the expected growth by some 60 percent over current levels of abstraction from the aquifer, the increase of potable water supply in the short-term and the longer-term through the interventions proposed below are essential to restoring the aquifer. Already the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) recommends ceasing abstraction immediately from the aquifer to avoid irreversible damage and enable its recovery, a process which is expected to take decades.

4.2.4 Shelter and Housing

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
\$129m	\$143m	\$910m	\$1,182m

Heavy bombardment of residential areas has damaged or demolished an estimated 60,000 housing units across Gaza, in a sector still trying to recover from previous bombardments and import bans on construction materials. This housing damage displaced one in four people in Gaza: at the time of going to print, over 110,000 people still remain in shelters or with host families.



A joint program for early recovery and reconstruction will be implemented by the Government, UNRWA, and UNDP to respond to the needs of refugee and non-refugee families whose houses had been affected by assault. The Government, UNRWA, and the UNDP will conduct joint shelter assessments of damaged and destroyed homes in Gaza to help facilitate a transition period for internally displaced persons.

Support to households is based on the extent of the damages suffered. The 20,000 families whose homes have been destroyed or severely damaged – and therefore are uninhabitable - will receive temporary support measures before their houses can be reconstructed. These include a rental subsidy/host family support package, which will provide each family between \$200-250 per month depending on family size for rental. A one-time reintegration cash allowance will also be provided to the families to enable the purchase of necessary NFIs. The Government will increase the currently limited rental capacity in Gaza by finishing 4,000 semi-constructed housing units for use as temporary shelters for IDPs over a two-year period.

Based on an assessment of the value of damages, the 40,000 families whose homes were partially damaged during the assault will receive support of up to \$3,000 per household to undertake house repairs.

In the longer-term, the 20,000 destroyed or severely damaged housing units will be rehabilitated or reconstructed by the Government and UNRWA. This will form the largest part of the housing budget, with the reconstruction cost of a unit estimated at \$60,000 and repair of severe damage at \$25,000.

In addition, the plan also covers 1,000 housing units destroyed that will also be reconstructed and rehabilitated to ease the pre-assault housing deficit.

The planned reconstruction and repair of these housing units is entirely contingent on the availability of construction materials, which – in turn – depends on the complete removal of restrictions on imports to the private sector imposed by Israel, in addition to removing obstacles and delays on the entry of materials to international agencies

4.2.5 Government Buildings and Other Public Infrastructure

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$51m	\$97m	\$149m

During the early recovery phase, ministries that were directly affected by the assault will provide temporary buildings and furniture for their employees. The Government will rehabilitate municipality buildings and facilities (e.g., garages, storehouses). UNRWA will repair partially damaged schools, health centers, food distribution centers, and offices.

Destroyed buildings will be reconstructed at a later stage and include UNRWA facilities and 106 public buildings (including 28 buildings destroyed in previous assaults). The Government will also repair recreational sites and lighting/electrical works.

4.2.6 Border Crossings

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$5m	\$50m	\$55m

In Gaza, the political and security turmoil has rendered the crossings totally dysfunctional or non-existent. A new arrangement at the crossings between Gaza and Israel and between Gaza and Egypt will be necessary. This Plan provides an overview of key functionalities to be achieved during the post-assault recovery and reconstruction. However, the details and prioritization of interventions at border crossings will be finalized in internationally-mediated negotiations.

Trade facilitation is the paramount driving force in the selection of border crossings. Gaza is and will continue to be dependent on trade with other countries for its economic development. As a result, border crossings must be strategically located.

Furthermore, special needs of certain products must be considered in locating and constructing border crossings: for instance, agricultural products, aggregates, and pipelines need to have dedicated crossings. Basic equipment and operational costs will be provided during the early recovery phase to facilitate movement through the crossings.

New infrastructure and additional facilities will be constructed for the movement of passengers. In addition to infrastructure development requirements at the crossings, off site infrastructure leading to the crossings will require development, in particular suitable access roads. Capacity development will also be required to ensure the effective and sustained operation of the crossings.

4.2.7 Roads

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	-	\$70m	\$70m

Extensive damage of municipal infrastructure is reported across Gaza, with the most damage inflicted in Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, Khuza'a, Bani Suheila, and Beit Lahia. Several roads will be rebuilt during the reconstruction phase, including the Al-Karamah road, the northern part of Salah Ed-Din road, and some municipal roads.



4.2.8 Summary of Interventions in Infrastructure Sector

Interventions & Estimated Costs by Phase			
Sub-Sector	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction
Rubble and ERW		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rubble and ERW removal Heavy machinery for MOPWH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rubble and ERW removal
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$20m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$14m</i>
Energy: electricity, fuel, and gas		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of power lines Equipment for network repair Alternative temporary electricity generation New supply line from Israel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoring transmission system New storage facility
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$32m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$153m</i>
Water, waste water and sanitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of temporary water provision Water provision to IDPs Clearance of transitional solid waste dump sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore PWA/CMWU capacity Continued restoration of temporary water provision Continued water provision to IDPs Rehabilitation of water and wastewater infrastructure Rehabilitation of solid waste disposal capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of PWA/CMWU capacity Continued rehabilitation of water and wastewater infrastructure Procurement of water from Israel (15MCM/year)
	<i>Estimated Cost: \$40m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$80m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$116m</i>
Housing and Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rental subsidy/host family support for those with uninhabitable housing One-time household items allowance for those with uninhabitable housing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary shelter solutions for those with uninhabitable housing Assessment and compensation for repair of damaged houses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of houses Repair of severely damaged houses
	<i>Estimated Cost: \$129m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$143m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$910m</i>
Public Buildings		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary location and furniture for affected ministries Repairs of UNRWA installations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of 106 public buildings Rehabilitation of lighting Rehabilitation of recreational sites (parks, sports facilities)
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$51m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$97m</i>
Roads			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Road repair
			<i>Estimated Cost: \$70m</i>
Border Crossings		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial limited operation of crossings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of border crossings
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$5m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$50m</i>
Environment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Environmental damage and hazardous waste management assessment 	
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$ 1m</i>	
ESTIMATED SUB-SECTOR COST	\$169m	\$332m	\$1,411m
TOTAL SECTOR COST		\$1.9b	

4.3 ECONOMIC SECTOR

The private sector has a crucial role to play in Gaza's early recovery and long-term economic growth. It will be the production and trading source of materials and services needed by Gaza residents to feed and clothe their families, repair their homes, and rebuild their lives. A stronger private sector can also generate more income-generation opportunities, whether through employment in existing companies or industries immediately critical to Gaza's recovery, including construction and agriculture.

In addition, Gaza has in the past demonstrated a high capacity for manufacturing and agricultural production in sectors such as furniture, textiles, strawberries, and flowers, to name a few. This capacity suggests a great potential for Gaza to serve as a hub for production of high quality goods and specialty services in the Middle East.

Therefore, rebuilding the private sector entails much more than rebuilding factories and farms damaged in recent years, and much more than re-creating former linkages to past markets in traditional sectors. The economy in Gaza must be reconceived to be better placed in responding to world market demands several years from now. This will require investment in a highly skilled, modern work force, the technology and equipment to produce high quality goods and services that command competitive prices, and an up-to-date and ever evolving understanding of the demands of world markets. The private sector must be ready soon to take advantage of the opportunity to serve markets from which it has been effectively banned for many years.



4.3.1 Agriculture and Fishing

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$194m	\$257m	\$451m

Given the seasonal nature of agricultural production, farmers will need rapid assistance in repairing agricultural land, crops, fruit trees, and livestock to restore their livelihoods and improve agricultural supplies to local markets. This will also be required for fishermen. Detailed assessments will be undertaken to assess damages and understand losses. Compensation for losses is expected to be a first step in early recovery.

Thereafter, Government will implement a series of interventions under the umbrella of an Agricultural Support Program (ASP). These interventions will provide assistance to small farmers and households who have been affected by the assault on Gaza, including:

1. Assistance to farmers who own or lease lands that have been affected by the Israeli assaults. Affected farmers will be supported by the provision of financing to procure needed greenhouse materials, water storage and drip irrigation systems, and seed/plant stock. To the extent possible, agricultural inputs should be procured locally to help restore Gaza industries. Repair or replacement of physical infrastructure of the agricultural sector will be needed.
2. Assistance to farmers and households who have lost livestock. ASP will provide financial assistance for these farmers to rehabilitate their livelihood assets; procure livestock and repair their farms.
3. Assistance to fishermen to repair and/or replace their damaged equipment and boats.

ASP will provide an important source of economic security to disadvantaged women and youth.

4.3.2 Industry and Manufacturing

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$75m	\$284m	\$359m



The Government will work to support the industrial and manufacturing sector in rebuilding its capacity and strengthening its future productivity. All industrial firms reporting damages will undergo a damage assessment that will certify the level of losses and eligibility for assistance.

Compensation for production losses will be distributed as a first step in early recovery.

Thereafter the Government will implement a series of interventions under the umbrella of an Industrial Repair Program (IRP). These interventions will rapidly respond to the severe damage to the private sector and help jump-start the production cycle, including in the food and construction sectors. These two industries are particularly critical. The food industry can help provide food security to Gazan citizens, whilst construction firms must be prepared to have an active role in the reconstruction efforts.

To be eligible for assistance, firms will need to show proven track records of production in the past, that they are economically viable, or have the potential to resume operations once equipment or physical infrastructure is restored.

The program will provide financial grants to firms to assist them to:

- Renovate and/or reconstruct destroyed business premises and facilities. Such premises have to be either owned by the applicant or leased for a minimum of one year from the application date.
- Repair or replace equipment in damaged factories and firms that have lost their core production equipment.
- Acquire office equipment, such as computers, telephones, fax machines, and furniture, to continue their operations.

The implementation approach will stress the importance of job creation not only at the beneficiary level but at the suppliers and service providers end as well. A cost-sharing mechanism by the firms will be encouraged.

The Government is exploring options to support the relocation of destroyed factories to the GIE, pending the immediate repair of damaged infrastructure of the industrial estate. Preliminary analysis suggest that also scope for expanding the GIE by 50 percent to accommodate these relocations.

4.3.3 Trade and services

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$130m	\$77m	\$207m

Similarly to industrial firms, all trade and services firms reporting damages will undergo a damage assessment that will certify the level of losses and eligibility for assistance.

Compensation for production losses will be distributed as a first step in early recovery.

Thereafter, the Government will implement a series of interventions under the umbrella of a Commercial and Services Rehabilitation Program (CSRP). The CSRP will provide cash grants to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) who have been affected by the assault. Co-ordinated interventions will offer commercial MSMEs (e.g. vendors, and small workshops) cash grants to repair damages in their facilities, replenish their lost stocks, and resume their businesses. The program will also identify damages in the services sector (e.g. hotels, restaurants, and ICT firms) and provide grants to damaged enterprises to repair and furnish their facilities and get back to work. If needed, businesses will then be connected to financial institutions (such as microfinance institutions) that work in Gaza in order to ensure access to finance for future needs.

The program will be implemented in a phased approach and payments will be done on installments to ensure that the businesses have actually fulfilled their commitments in terms of repairing their facilities and procured goods and / or productive assets.



4.3.4 Employment and Livelihood

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$62m	\$7m	\$69m

Unemployment has increased from the pre-assault 45 percent, as a result of damage to industries and commercial enterprises. Job creation will stimulate early recovery both at the household level and in key private sector areas that can use manpower to rehabilitate and re-activate their industries.

Cash-for-work (CFW) will be a key early recovery initiative, supporting other interventions, including repair and recovery, including rubble removal for temporary housing, infrastructure works related to reconstruction, labor intensive road tiling, digging ditches for water and wastewater pipes, and repairing industrial zones.

4.3.5 Facilitating Investment

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$20m	\$130m	\$150m

Availability of capital will be critical to the recovery and reconstruction efforts of the private sector. Recognizing the extreme pressure that the assault has placed on private businesses, the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) has already implemented a scheme for deferral of repayment of existing loans. Looking forward, in addition to providing compensation and assistance to the private sector, the Government, and the PMA will work with the banking sector to put in place appropriate financing mechanisms to enable the private sector to access additional financing for the recovery and reconstruction efforts. Through these mechanisms, the private sector should be able to secure increased access to working capital (for small repairs and restocking of raw materials) as well as long-term capital (for rehabilitation and reconstruction of own capacity, but also for development and delivery of reconstruction projects), at reduced interest rates. Alongside additional financing mechanisms, options for affordable risk insurance for domestic businesses will be explored. These facilities will allow selected businesses to leverage the compensation and assistance they receive to greater effect and at lower risk.

Alongside increased financing, the Government will deliver selected capacity development programs, to strengthen the likelihood of success of reconstruction efforts by the private sector and drive increased profitability. These will include professional training, improvement of management skills, marketing support, and awareness of financing strategies and options.

4.3.6 Summary of Interventions in Economic Sector

Interventions & Estimated Costs by Phase			
Sub-Sector	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction
Agriculture		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed assessment of the agriculture sector Compensation for production, livestock and fishing losses Restoration of farm land, fruits, and crops Restoration of livestock economy Rehabilitation of fishing equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of agricultural infrastructure and assets Continued restoration of fruits and crops Continued restoration of livestock economy Continued rehabilitation of fishing equipment
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$194m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$257m</i>
Industry and Manufacturing		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed assessment of damaged facilities Compensation for production losses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation and reconstruction of 990 industrial facilities Rehabilitation and possible expansion of Gaza Industrial Estate and other industrial zones
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$75m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$284m</i>
Trade and Services		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed assessment of damaged facilities Compensation for losses Rehabilitation of some 3,400 commercial establishments Rehabilitation of telecommunication infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconstruction of some 800 commercial establishments Rehabilitation of tourism facilities
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$130m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$77m</i>
Employment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cash for work programs in support of rehabilitation and reconstruction (will remain ongoing for reconstruction period also) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Vocational training opportunities to improve employment opportunities
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$62m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$7m</i>
Facilitating Private Investment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financing facility for repairs and restarting of operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expanded range of financing facilities for investment Expansion of risk guarantees for domestic firms Capacity building
		<i>Estimated Cost: \$20m</i>	<i>Estimated Cost: \$130m</i>
ESTIMATED SUB-SECTOR COST		\$481m	\$754m
TOTAL SECTOR COST		\$1.2b	

4.4 GOVERNANCE SECTOR

The consolidation of the public administration in Gaza is both a means and an end. In the short-term, the implementation of the recovery and reconstruction plan can only be achieved by restoring and maintaining the existing operational capacity of central and local government institutions, under the authority of the Government. These operational capacities are absolutely vital to the implementation of the recovery and reconstruction plan as a whole, and thus constitute an overall recovery foundation.

Within an overall climate of a fragile security situation, stability can be undermined easily. Early recovery and reconstruction will quickly lose traction if a security vacuum is allowed to take hold in Gaza. Preventing a security vacuum will require the maintenance of law and order under the authority of the Government by reintroducing civil police under a unified command.

Maintaining and expanding the operational capacity of the Government will need to go hand in hand with the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged infrastructure for Government institutions.



4.4.1 Operational Capacity of Central Government Institutions

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$113m	-	\$113m

To boost existing operational capacities of government institutions in Gaza for recovery and reconstruction, the Government aims at reintegrating existing civil servants, hired before June 2007 into Government institutions, streamlining the civil service, and fully harmonizing these institutions with national institutions.

The National Consensus Government has established a Legal and Administrative Committee to explore options and scenarios for consolidating the civil service and determining the status of the civil personnel engaged by the previous de facto authority in Gaza. This committee was established in early June and originally mandated for four months. Due to the political and security situation in Gaza, the work of the committee has been stalled since early July. A Higher Security Committee will be established by the President that will discuss the options for the security apparatus.

The work of these committees will need to explore options for affected personnel, including the options for early retirement, retraining, and job placement in the private sector or with non-governmental service providers. At the same time, the consolidation process needs to take into account the existing civil servants in Gaza who have not been on active duty for the past seven years and might require renewed training and capacity development to fulfill their functions. The consolidation process will need to be guided by available fiscal resources and real needs on the ground in each sector.

The reconsolidation of the public administration, however, will not be completed by harmonizing civil servants in Gaza and the West Bank. Beyond civil servants, the Government will implement an action plan for national institutional reintegration and for harmonizing the administrative legal framework. In doing so, the National Consensus Government will adopt a sequenced approach and prioritize sectors crucial for service delivery, which simultaneously also contain the largest number of personnel.

Reintegrating the rule of law system is important for functional social and economic ties between the West Bank and Gaza. A functioning public administration furthermore requires freedom of movement within the country, which includes the ability to meet in person by traveling between the West Bank and Gaza, which under the Oslo Accords constitute a "single territorial unit".

The consolidation of the public administration will not only cement the National Consensus Government but will also improve fiscal sustainability and effective service delivery for recovery, reconstruction, and longer-term development. However, this consolidation cannot be implemented overnight and will take several months.

In the meantime, the smooth operation of central government institutions in Gaza needs to be safeguarded. During such a transition period, until the Legal and Administrative Committee concludes its works, it is essential that civil personnel engaged by the previous de facto authority receive compensation in the form of social allowances for six months under a temporary mechanism, outside the government budget, enabling them to concentrate on their work while they and their families are provided for. This assumes that in parallel the Legal and Administrative Committee is able to assume its work aimed at resolving the status of this group and consolidating the civil service.

This requires support to the Legal and Administrative Committee in defining a mechanism for expedited steps, sequenced by priority sectors, towards the consolidation of civil servants, institutions and applicable legal frameworks. Once the mechanism has been elaborated, its implementation will also require initial funding to accommodate and retrain civil servants for resuming their positions.

4.4.2 Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$31m	-	\$31m

In order to restore and maintain the operational capacity of local government units in Gaza for recovery and reconstruction tasks, the Government seeks immediate exceptional supplementary funding for municipal personnel for a period of six months. Fuel and office supplies will also be provided.

Restoring physical infrastructure and equipment for municipalities will be equally important in order to allow municipalities to provide regular services, and support their role in the recovery and reconstruction effort.

4.4.3 Rule of Law and Human Rights

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$1m	\$6m	\$7m

The request for allowances to civil personnel above also includes personnel of the courts system.

This needs to be complemented by support to legal assistance to vulnerable groups, including IDPs and the bereaved, particularly women and children. In this regard, immediate support needs to be provided to legal aid and arbitration for IDPs, while, in the medium-term, the partially destroyed legal aid system needs to be rehabilitated.

Civil society organizations with a focus on human rights require support to monitor adherence to human rights principles within the fragile rule of law setting in the aftermath of the war.

4.4.4 Implementation and Coordination

Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction	Total
-	\$12m	\$20m	\$32m

The MOPWH, UNRWA, and UNDP will conduct cross-sectoral assessment of damages to infrastructure and buildings. Once these assessments are done, the Government will use strategic spatial planning to build back better, particularly in residential neighborhoods and community infrastructure. Spatial planning is most critical for the most affected localities, including Shujaiyeh and Khuza'a.

To support this and other implementation management tasks for this Plan, the Government will scale up its capacity for coordination, implementation, and monitoring of needs assessments and recovery and reconstruction interventions. Capacity will also be needed to monitor arrangements for the import of building materials.

4.4.5 Summary of Interventions in Governance Sector

Interventions & Estimated Costs by Phase			
Sub-Sector	Relief	Early Recovery	Reconstruction
Public Administration		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of personnel allowances under a temporary mechanism (6 months) Reintegration of public administration systems 	
<i>Estimated Cost: \$113m</i>			
Local Governance		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supplementary salaries for municipal staff for 6 months Provision of fuel of office supplies Review of municipal functional capacity Rehabilitation of municipality buildings Replacement of destroyed equipment and vehicles 	
<i>Estimated Cost: \$31m</i>			
Rule of Law and Human Rights		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigation of violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Legal aid and arbitration for IDPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of legal aid clinics and support to legal aid system
<i>Estimated Cost: \$1m</i>			<i>Estimated Cost: \$6m</i>
Implementation and Coordination		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scaling up recovery and reconstruction implementation capacity Strategic spatial planning Monitoring of building material imports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scaling up recovery and reconstruction implementation capacity Strategic spatial planning Monitoring of building material imports
<i>Estimated cost: \$12m</i>			<i>Estimated Cost: \$20m</i>
ESTIMATED SUB-SECTOR COST		\$157m	\$26m
TOTAL SECTOR COST		\$183m	

SECTION **5**

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS AND PERFORMANCE MONITORING

This plan presents the blueprint and guiding framework for the relief, response and recovery efforts in Gaza for 2014-2017. While international partners are kindly requested to provide adequate funding, ultimate responsibility for the delivery of the plan rests with the National Consensus Government, which will act as the single address for all planning, implementation, and financing issues with respect to the recovery and reconstruction of Gaza.

Detailed planning and active management of the recovery and reconstruction process will be essential to ensure effective implementation. In this respect, the mandate of the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee on Recovery and Reconstruction will be extended to oversee the implementation of the Plan. The Committee will be supported by a new Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Unit. An immediate priority for the Committee, the Government and partners will be to complete the detailed damage assessments and develop detailed implementation plans by sector and at the local level. These plans will include clear objectives and targets, which will provide the basis for results based management of the implementation process, which in turn will drive increased accountability and successful delivery.

1. **Government Leadership through the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee**
2. **Co-ordination with Partners**
3. **Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Unit**
4. **Detailed Damage Assessments and Action Planning at Sector and Municipality Level**



5.1 Government Leadership through the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee

The development of the current plan was spearheaded by the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee on Recovery and Reconstruction, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister. In order to facilitate continuity between the planning and implementation phases, the mandate of the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee will be extended to cover implementation of the Plan.

The Committee will be responsible for setting priorities, approving the allocation of international and Governmental funding against specified priorities, actively monitoring progress and reporting to Cabinet, and addressing implementation challenges with national and international partners. Membership of the Committee will continue to comprise the Minister of Finance/Planning; the Minister of Social Affairs/Agriculture; the Minister of Public Works and Housing; the Minister of Local Government; the Head of the Palestinian Water Authority; and the Head of Energy and Natural Resources Authority.

During the implementation phase, a key area of attention for the Higher Committee will be the critical implementation pre-requisites, which must be sustained in order for the Plan to be effective. In line with this, specific action plans will also be developed for effective execution of the enablers, particularly with regard to movement and access. Should progress of implementation on these issues stall, partners and the international community will be called upon to provide required support to enable the facilitation of recovery and reconstruction.



5.2 Co-ordination with Partners

Whilst the Government will steer the recovery and reconstruction effort, the important contribution of the Government's national and international partners cannot be underestimated. The National Consensus Government will work in the spirit of common purpose and coordinated action with all its partners - international donors, the private sector and civil society – to restore stability and rebuild Gaza.

The Government will establish a Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Advisory Board, which will include representatives of the private sector, civil society, and key international partners. The Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee will meet with the Board on a quarterly basis to share ideas and strategies with regard to the recovery and reconstruction efforts.

At the working level, existing mechanisms will be actively leveraged to ensure co-ordination with all partners in planning and implementation. These include the Local Aid Co-ordination Secretariat (LACS), Sector Working Groups, and the humanitarian clusters. The electronic aid information management platform DARP (Development Assistance and Reform Platform), housed at the MOPAD, is expected to be the tool used to monitor financial assistance from donors against the plan. The tool will be adapted to include a module specific to the Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza. All projects will be entered into DARP by the Government and donors will be required to provide updates based on a pre-agreed schedule.

5.3 Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Unit

Given the breadth and complexity of activities that will be required for the response –touching all sectors, all geographical areas, and involving direct support to at least a quarter of the population - a new Implementation unit will be established to drive implementation. The Unit will report to the Higher Inter-Ministerial Committee and work closely with Government ministries and agencies, as well as the international community, civil society, and private sector, to ensure the execution of the priority recovery and reconstruction interventions in this Plan.

In the immediate period, the Unit will work to support ministries, agencies, and municipalities with effective prioritization, detailed planning, and setting targets for the recovery and reconstruction efforts. Thereafter, the Unit will play an active role in obtaining regular status reports on the priority interventions under the Plan from the ministries, identifying challenges in their implementation, and strengthening co-ordination between sectors as well as ministries.

The Unit will provide monthly status reports to the Council of Ministers through the Inter-Ministerial Committee during the first six months of recovery reconstruction, and move to a quarterly reporting basis in thereafter. The reports will focus on progress of the most critical elements of the Plan and recommendations regarding accelerating implementation. The Unit will also work with ministries and agencies to ensure that decisions from the Council of Ministers are rapidly implemented.

5.4 Detailed Damage Assessments and Action Planning at Sector and Municipality Level

This plan forms the skeleton of the recovery effort and is based on an initial assessment of the impact of the Israeli assault. Effective implementation will require significant further work in terms of detailed diagnosis, planning, and programming of specific response interventions in each sector.

Detailed Damage and Needs Assessments are currently underway through Government ministries and agencies, overseen by the Technical Committee, and with the support of the UN, the World Bank, and the EU. These will form the basis of detailed intervention planning for early recovery. The assessments will include baseline GIS data regarding all facilities which were damaged.

Detailed Action Planning will follow the finalization of the damage assessments, and will be undertaken at the sector levels in collaboration with national partners. It is expected that this process will validate many of the high level recommendations of this report and develop them further into specific projects and interventions. It will also propose additional measures to respond to the breadth of damage and needs as they become better understood.

The detailed action planning process will be completed in 2014. The output of this process will be a series of sector and municipality action plans, which will be consolidated into a Recovery and Rehabilitation Implementation Strategy. This ongoing planning process will not hinder on-going and immediate implementation of immediate humanitarian measures and early recovery interventions. These will be ongoing throughout.

The sector plans and interventions will be underpinned by a **clear Monitoring and Evaluation Framework**, which will capture goals, objectives, outputs and outcomes in each sector and intervention. These will also be linked to the budget and financial inputs required for delivery.

Results monitoring at the sector level will be the primarily responsibility of line ministries/concerned budget entities, in cooperation with national and international partners. MOPAD's Monitoring and Evaluation department will compile sector level data into quarterly monitoring reports of the Plan. Financial input and results reports will be accessible on the MOPAD website and will be discussed by the Plan's management structure as a tool for evidence-based decision making.

SECTION **6**

FINANCING REQUIREMENTS AND MECHANISMS

1. Overview of Current Fiscal Situation
2. Summary of Recovery and Reconstruction Costs
3. Financing Mechanisms



6.1 Overview of Current Fiscal Situation

The Palestinian Government has made significant and continued efforts to improve its fiscal performance through revenue reforms and expenditure limitations. In 2013, on account of these measures, the fiscal deficit declined by 2.7 percentage points to 13.9 percent of GDP. However, the Government's fiscal position remains extremely fragile, highly reliant on donor support, and highly dependent on economic and political relations with Israel. By the end of 2013 public debt, including arrears and clearance revenue advances, had reached \$4.6 billion, close to 40 percent of GDP.

The total budget for 2014 was \$4.4 billion, comprising 92 percent recurrent and 8 percent development expenditure. Even before the National Consensus Government was formed, expenses on Gaza comprised almost 40 percent of the budget, comprising payments of salaries for public-sector workers; coverage of non-wage bill items like health referrals, medical supplies, and social assistance; and coverage of fuel and net lending expenses for electricity and water. Disbursements amount to approximately \$120 million on a monthly basis or \$1.44 billion annually.

	2013 (Actual)	2014 (Projected)	% Change
	USD m	USD m	%
Gross Revenues	2,687	2,923	9%
Total Net Revenues	2,443	2,752	13%
Total Expenditure and Net Lending	3,903	4,110	5%
<i>Of which Gaza expenditure</i>	1,440	1,440	-
Current Balance	(1,460)	(1,358)	-7%
Development Expenditures	197	316	60%
Total Balance	(1,657)	(1,674)	1%

In its September 2014 report to the AHLC, the IMF described the near-term fiscal outlook as challenging in any scenario, without accounting for the spending needed for Gaza reconstruction. It forecasts a fiscal gap of approximately \$350 million for 2014, accounting for 16.5 percent of GDP, assuming that overall donor financing will reach \$1.5 billion.

The July/August assault in Gaza has provided an unprecedented shock to the Government's already strained budget position. The National Consensus Government is faced with a recovery and reconstruction bill that is equivalent to the entire 2014 budget, 13 times the 2014 development budget, and over 20 times the 2013 development budget. In the absence of external support, incurring the cost of reconstruction would imply not being able to meet recurrent expenditures in the West Bank and/or up to a doubling of the existing public debt, neither of which is practically or politically possible.

Given the scale and urgency of the challenge, the Government has no choice but to reach out to the international community for support with this momentous task.

The Government sees the investment in Gaza as an investment in stability and the viability of a future Palestinian state. Whilst Gaza's rebuilding will be costly in the short- to medium -term, the Government's vision for Gaza is one of sustainability and self-sufficiency, where Gaza is an integral driver of the Palestinian economy and where it contributes to the fiscal position of the Government.

6.2 Summary of Recovery and Reconstruction Costs

The total costs of the reconstruction effort are estimated at \$4 billion, of which \$414 million is required for immediate relief, \$1.2 billion for early recovery, and \$2.4 billion for the reconstruction of Gaza. Financing for the immediate relief and early recovery phases is required immediately; financing for reconstruction projects will be required in 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Summary Costs by Sector and Sub-Sector

Sector	Sub-Sector	Relief Phase (USD m)	Early Recovery Phase (USD m)	Reconstruction Phase (USD m)	Total (USD, m)
Social	Social Protection	230	8	80	317
	Health and Psychosocial Support	14	159	45	218
	Education and Higher Education	1	45	75	121
	Civil Society	0	4	41	45
	Sub-total	245	215	241	701
Infrastructure & Environment	Rubble & ERW	0	20	14	34
	Energy	0	32	153	185
	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	40	80	116	236
	Housing and Shelter	129	143	910	1,182
	Governmental Buildings and Other Public Infrastructure	0	51	97	149
	Border Crossings	0	5	50	55
	Roads	0	0	70	70
	Environment	0	1	0	1
	Sub-total	169	332	1,411	1,911
Economic	Agriculture	0	194	257	451
	Industry and Manufacturing	0	75	284	359
	Trade and Services	0	130	77	207
	Employment	0	62	7	69
	Promoting Investment	0	20	130	150
	Sub-total	0	481	754	1,235
Governance	Operational Capacity of Central Gov. Institutions	0	113	0	113
	Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions	0	31	0	31
	Rule of Law and Human Rights	0	1	6	7
	Implementation and Coordination	0	12	20	32
	Sub-total	0	157	26	183
TOTAL		414	1,184	2,432	4,030

This Plan quantifies the direct costs of recovery and reconstruction, which are separate from existing commitments on budget support to the Government. However continuation of existing budget support to the Government will be a vital element for sustaining government functions in both Gaza and the West Bank, meeting the government's existing responsibilities to its employees and citizens, as well as providing the basis for recovery and reconstruction in Gaza. Budget support will ensure continued provision of health and education services, purchases of electricity, fuel and water, as well as maintaining social support.

Therefore, in addition to seeking financial support for the direct costs of recovery and reconstruction, the Government urges donors to complete the budget support for 2014 and fund required budget support for the next three years. Without this, the proper functioning of the National Consensus Government, as well as recovery and reconstruction in Gaza, will be impossible.

The impact of assault on budget support for the Government in 2015 and beyond is not yet clear. However, it is likely that the additional burden that the assault has created for Gaza's social support, education, and health services, amongst others, may require an further increase in budget support beyond current levels and the costs already captured under the Recovery and Reconstruction Plan. At least some of these costs should be outweighed by additional revenues from Gaza as the situation stabilizes and the Gaza economy recovers, which are currently unaccounted for. The net impact of integrating Gaza fully into the fiscal framework will become clearer with time, as the longer-term systemic impacts become evident.

At present, the total value of required budget support for the State of Palestine 2014-2017 has been estimated at \$4.5 billion.

Budget support required

	USD m
Budget support committed and but not disbursed in 2014	580
Budget support required for 2015-2017	3,924
Total Budget Support for Recovery and Reconstruction Period	4,504

6.3 Financing Mechanisms

Early recovery and reconstruction efforts must be guided by two pivotal principles: national ownership and rapid implementation. Consideration for these two principles is also central to the financing mechanism proposed for the implementation of the Plan.

In line with the principle of ownership, the National Consensus Government has a strong preference for the utilization of the Government's Central Treasury Account (CTA) as the primary financing mechanism for the Recovery and Reconstruction of Gaza. The CTA not only allows for implementing budget programs and receiving budget support, but has also been used to the full satisfaction of the Government and donors alike for earmarked funding to specific programs and projects. The soundness of the Government's public financial management system and the CTA has been applauded by the International Finance Institutions in past reports to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC).

However, recognizing the constraints of international organizations, the Government accepts that other financing mechanism may be necessary to complement funding through Government channels in order to allow for rapid implementation. Nevertheless, to serve the aim of efficiency and effective co-ordination, the Government urges donors to restrict this external funding to the limited number of existing mechanisms that have been shown as effective and are believed to be sufficient for an effective reconstruction effort. These are:

1. **UN Agencies:** Direct funding can be provided to established UN agencies already working on the ground, including UNRWA and UNDP, for a range of issues including support to the refugee population, ERW removal, and infrastructure development.
2. **PEGASE:** The "Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-économique" established by the European Union can be used to enable support for the Palestinian Administration and Services, including salaries to staff; support to the Social Protection System via cash transfers and other mechanisms, and support to private sector enterprises.
3. **World Bank:** Funding via the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (PRDP-MDTF) can be channeled for budget support to drive the reform and institution building agenda; and via the Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund (PID-MDTF) for energy, water, sanitation, and urban development investments.

The private sector and NGOs are important implementing partners who are expected to receive funding via the above financing channels. A more detailed mapping of the applicability of the different mechanisms to different subsectors is shown in Annex 1. As for the Arab States, they can channel their support through the Islamic Development Bank, which in turn will utilize the above financing mechanisms to deliver its support.

The use of alternative funding mechanisms should not undermine the Government's leadership role on the reconstruction effort. Therefore, the Inter-Ministerial Committee will serve as a Steering Committee for the recovery and reconstruction effort, approving the allocation of funding for intervention programs, and ensuring coordinated implementation and overall financial management of the Recovery and Reconstruction Plan.

Annex 1: Mapping of Financing Mechanisms

		Government		Donor Agencies			Other	
		Central Treasury Account	MDLF	UNRWA (for refugees)	Specialized UN Agencies	EU (PEGASE)	World Bank (incl. Infra. Trust Fund)	NGOs
xx Prioritized mechanism x Alternative mechanism								
Social	Social Protection	xx		xx	xx (WFP, UNDP, UNICEF)	x		
	Health, Psycho-Social Care	xx		xx	xx (WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF)		x	x
	Education and Higher Education	xx		xx	xx (UNICEF, UNESCO)		x	
	Civil Society, CBOs and FBOs							xx
Infrastructure	Rubble & ERW	xx			xx (UNDP, UNMAS)			
	Energy	xx			x		x	
	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	xx		x	x		x	
	Housing and Shelter	xx		xx	x (UNHABITAT)		x	
	Governmental and Other Public Infrastructure	xx	xx	xx				
	Border crossings	xx						
	Roads	x	xx		x		x	
	Environment	xx			x			
Economic	Agriculture	xx			x (FAO)	xx		x
	Industry and Manufacturing	xx				xx	x	
	Trade and Services	xx				xx	x	
	Employment	xx		xx	x (UNDP)	x	x	
	Facilitating Investment	xx						x (Banks)
Governance	Public Administration	xx			xx (UNDP)	xx	x	
	Local Governance	xx	xx		x		x	
	Rule of Law and Human Rights	x			xx (UNDP)			xx
	Implementation and Co-ordination	xx			x			

